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Evolution Ethics

Chas. M. Melden

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For the views contained in the following essay, the
iter holds himself responsible, and yet he professes that he cannot
ut his finger on a single original thought. To those to whom he
s under chief obligation, Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston, must
e mentioned as the first, both in his personal instructions, and in
is published writings. Much is owed to Lotze, the mediator of
odern thought and traditionalism; and to Professor Otto Pleiderer,
of Berlin. Upon the past, from which we all draw some of our most
enduring and saving thought, we all rest.

G. B. Mayo (Mass)
PH. D. 1895
Evanston, May 17th 1895.

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The Natural and the Supernatural.

A.

The antithesis expressed by the terms natural and supernatural has been recognized as a fact in the religious consciousness of man from the earliest times down to the present. Its most general meaning may be expressed in the phrase "God and the world", and its most general significance may be said to be a contrast between the world of familiar daily experiences among sensible things, over which man exercises more or less control, and a world of higher power, or powers, transcendent to man and nature, and dominant, in some sort of arbitrary or regulative way over them.

After stating thus generally this contrast between the natural and the supernatural, in order to express a quite universal consensus, we must recognize the greatest variety of opinion as to how that contrast is to be conceived, arising out of the various stages of intellectual and moral culture or social and individual temperament. It will not be amiss to take a hasty view of the opinions of antiquity, before taking up the bearings of modern thought upon our subject.

Historical investigation carries us back to primitive man when, by a rational impulse yet crude and undeveloped, he attributed to spirits unusual events in his life. As his knowledge of the natural order was exceedingly limit-ed, the number of events to be explained

supernaturally was correspondingly great. To these must be added the activities of nature beyond his control or understanding. He vaguely felt, rather than conceived, the integrity of the human personality; and so he thought of his departed ancestors as retaining their identity in a supersensuous, invisible world, and still exercising their activity in the course of events. In time, as families grew into clans, clans into tribes, and tribes into the social order of nations, these ancestral spirits developed into tribal or national hero-gods.

At the same time, the crude rational impulse led the primitive man to interpret the activities of nature in terms of his own personality, and, consequently, there gradually arose a vast horde of nature-spirits ruling in the sky and on the earth. And along with the social development, these spirits were gathered into a well ordered mythology of supreme and subordinate gods, with nature apportioned out among them. At this stage of man's progress, we find a reasonable degree of intellectual, æsthetic, and moral development, as may be seen in such literary products as the Vedic Hymns, the Illiad, or the Niebelungen Lied. The intellect sought to satisfy itself in giving some account of the cause of things and the connection among them; the æsthetic nature found satisfaction in reducing all to a beautiful harmony of poetic representation; while the moral nature expressed itself in giving to the gods a judicial control over individuals and society. While all this may at first impress us as possessing merely a certain charming naïvete, we shall see, on further

analysis, that it reveals certain rational tendencies within us that are abiding. We shall see the necessity, not only of finding a cause for things above us, but also of attributing to that cause or those causes, intelligent activity; we shall see, moreover, the fundamental necessity of interpreting the world in terms of our own mind; we shall find, not only, as Goethe says, that we are more anthropomorphic than we think, but also that we must be anthropomorphic in order to think at all.

And now, in the midst of naïve reflection upon the cosmos, resulting in mythological conceptions of the natural and supernatural, there emerges self-conscious reflection, first, upon the course of nature, and then, upon the course of the social order. Primitive culture could not advance very far, before reflection upon the observed regularity in the succession of days and seasons, in the uniform cycles of vegetal and animal life, and, in general, upon the well ordered procedure of an increasing number of events, led to the inevitable conviction, that the supernatural powers ruled in nature, not according to mere arbitrary caprice, but under some regulative common order. Further reflection would refer this order to some supreme power among the gods, and thus reach what Max Müller calls a henotheism; or to some general law, inherent in the universe and standing not only above nature, but also above the gods,—resulting in various abstract conceptions of being. These abstractions took such forms as the Hindu impersonal conceptions of Rita and Karma, or as the Greek Moira and Nemesis, or as the Chinese Tao. There is clearly

seen here, in the notion of a world-ruling power above the gods, a tendency toward monotheism and, as well, toward all those modern forms of materialistic monism which dispense with God altogether. There were two main directions thought took, in the past, toward monotheism, which resulted in two different monotheistic ideas. The Hindu and Greek mind, by continued abstraction and generalization from the phenomena of nature, reached the simple unity of a single substance and a universal law, that is, pantheism, which must be distinguished, in motive, from a later materialistic atheism. The Hebrew mind, on the other hand, starting from the tribal god, expanded the sphere of his power and moralized his nature until a true notion of ethical theism was reached, which we find represented in the Prophets.

These two directions, taken by the thought of antiquity toward the monotheistic idea, are based on two possible ways of conceiving unity. Unity may be thought of as simple being, changeless and distinctionless. This notion is the natural outcome of mere logical abstraction, seeking some ultimate universal conception or single substance. This we might call logical unity.

On the other hand, unity may be conceived of as living being, capable of self-directed activity. This view arises out of reflection upon the moral nature, which recognizes the self-identical ego, freely acting in a variety of ways. This we might call ethical unity.

That power of the mind whose interests are exhausted in the discov-

ery of logical truths, is characterized by passivity; when the truth appears, nothing is to be done but to recognize it.

That power of the mind whose interests are concerned with the realization of moral ideals, is characterized by activity. When the ethical truth is made known, it is not simply to be accepted passively, but to be acted upon, in this way or that, in order to realize in the self what has come to be known. The same also may be said of æsthetic truth; it, too, is to be realized.

Were man but a cognitive being, his sole business would be to make himself acquainted with the truth; that done, all would be done. But he is æsthetic and moral as well, and when æsthetic and moral truths come to him, as ideals of beauty and goodness, he has not simply to accept them, but to act upon them in such a way as to make the ideal real. But among the various interests of man, arising out of his trinal nature, moral demands are recognized everywhere as paramount. The categorical imperative has the first claim to our consideration and obedience, however much æsthetic or intelectual interests may press upon us. Yet the whole spiritual nature must be harmonized in its thought of the true, the beautiful, and the good. The bearing of this statement upon the right conception of God will be seen further on. At present, it is used to estimate in a general way the worth of the two monotheistic ideas just mentioned, viz: pantheism and theism.

When we turn to the Greeks and Hindus, whose thought evolved pantheism, we shall find that they restricted themselves to a narrow

intellectualism. It is conceivable how these peoples might have risen to a conception of the divine unity, by reducing the various nature-gods of the popular mythology to manifestations of the supreme God, whose infinitude of being shows itself in an infinity of activities thoroughout the universe. But, as a matter of fact, they took a less reasonable course. Led by a natural propensity to abstraction and generalization, they finally came to the unity of being, in which there is no change or distinction, and which is but the logical abstraction of pure existence; just the notion, so far as reality is concerned, of mere nothing. While such a thought is a great advance over the mythological chaos of polytheism, in which innumerable independent gods, great and small, are working at cross purposes, in that it attains to the notion of a unitary Infinite, it has the radical defect of expressing only the logical form of being, from which living reality is absent, and into which living reality must be put, before it can meet the requirements of the speculative, moral, and religious mind. As it is, this Brahmanic and Eleatic conception gathers into itself all finite things, but in no way is capable of causally producing them. It turns the manifold and changeable world of experience, including the self and its consciousness, into an unsubstantial appearance, and sweeps away the distinctions of good and bad, true and false, pain and pleasure, into an absolute Illusionism. The Greek mind, however, was too vigorous to rest in this empty conclusion and, in Plato, rose to a much nobler conception of God, because more accordant with reality and

the demands of total thought. Although Plato accepted the Eleatic distiction between the world of sense, which has only apparent reality, and the "really real", exalted above space and time; he did not conceive this latter as a mere abstraction, but as a world of prototypal ideas, unified into a harmonious whole, and constituting the true, the beautiful, and the good. The idea of God, the highest idea, the idea of perfect being, was for him the all embracing bond of the ideal world, and the ultimate ground of all knowing, or the truth, and, as well, the ultimate end of all being, or the good. "That God's essential being is good, that all statements regarding God are to be measured by the idea of the good, and that He is therefore as much the ground of justice in the moral world as of truth and beauty in the natural world -- these are the central thoughts of the Platonic philosophy, the high historical significance and abiding truth of which stand fast, although it may also have to be recognized that its original intuitions were still affected with the limits of Greek thinking". (Pf's Phil. and Dev. of Religion, Vol.I P.116)

It will be seen that the great superiority of this view of God over the empty abstractions of simple Being, is in the fact that it does not merely assert existence as the true, but gives to that existence a living reality of goodness and beauty, so that it becomes the ground for the realization of the beautiful and the good.

But when this supernatural ideal world, which was with Plato the real world, came into relations with nature or the apparently real world,

Plato's limitations appear in his dualism between the rational idea and the irrational reality. Although the pure ideas of the divine world seek for representation in nature, yet the impurity and imperfection of matter renders this representation obscure and distorted. Indeed, so disparate were these two worlds that some mediation was necessary, and this Plato found in the soul of the world and the soul of man, which lie midway between reason and sense.

What influence this notion of an opposition between the supernatural and natural worlds, which must be mediated by some middle principle that entered into both, had upon the thought of subsequent times may be seen in some of the doctrines of christian theology.

That Plato came so near to a satisfactory ethical theism, without reaching it, may find some explanation in one or both of two conditions, one of which was inherent in the Greek mind, the other arising out of the lack of better scientific culture. Though Plato recognized the great value of the ethical element in God, as the ground of willing and actualizing the good, he, in common with his race, was characterized by Intellectualism and Aestheticism, rather than by that ethical depth and power which alone recognizes the necessary realization of the good, in the full lordship of the Divine Being over the real world, as he moves irresistibly to the accomplishment of his chosen ends.

The want of a better scientific culture, which the times of Plato could not supply, made it impossible for him to see that the world, instead of being refractory to the divine ideas, is just the expres-

sion of them, manifested in a uniform method of procedure. Aristotle but continued this radical dualism. The rational purposes, as the working forms of things to be seen everywhere in the world, were in conflict with irrational matter, and, because of its resistance to purpose and conception, never entirely overcome. Thus God, who is pure form and pure activity, did not come to the rulership over nor revelation in the world, which imperfectly strove after his perfection. God in his eternal, unchanging being was exalted far above the change and suffering of the world and man.

The Epicurean temperament, in its superficial way, united the vulgar polytheism with this idea of divine trancendence, in a representation of the gods as enjoying themselves, far above the world and careless of the affairs of men; and so devoted itself to a cheerful hedonistic life.

Stoicism, on the other hand, with a deeper spiritual seriousness, sought to approach practically the indifferentism of the Divine Being, and waivered between the older pantheism, which conceived God as the elemental fire, from which all things sprung and into which they returned, and the later Platonic doctrine of the world-reason, the all-wise Providence which guides and orders all, wherein there is an approach to an immanent ethical Monotheism. The Stoics did not utterly discard the gods of the people, but considered them as manifestations of the Supreme Being, or his ministering sprits.

There is no further notion of classical antiquity, concerning the world and God, the natural and the supernatural, to be noticed, ex-

cept perhaps that of Neo-Platonism, the last struggle of ancient thought to combat the growing and triumphant Christian philosophy. Carrying the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of God to its utmost logical conclusion, as a deity divested of all positive attributes, wholly incognizable by, and inaccessible to, clear thinking, the Neo-Platonists had the more need of retaining the popular mythology; and did so by making the national gods half divine middle beings or demons, whose function was to mediate between the changeless and unknown Deity and the changing becoming world.

As Hellenic thought had thus exhausted itself in reaching a practical Agnosticism, by reason of its lack of ethical depth and power, we must turn to the people in whom the moral sense was first and paramount, in order to gain a more complete and saving conception of God and the world. This deep ethical sense was natural to the Hebrew people. The first biblical records of them indeed presents a low stage of religious culture. Their tribal god, Yaweh, was at first very much like the gods of the surrounding Semitic tribes, and his worship was a crude and degraded cult. But gradually the ethical consciousness of the nation expressed itself in the Prophets, who persistently opposed the ethical character and requirements of God to the popular modes of worship, on which the people as a mass placed reliance. That the essence of God is Holy Will, realizing itself in the history of the nation, carried the necessary conviction, that adversity and prosperity alike were only means for the accomplishment

of the Divine purposive ends, either to chastise the nation for its sins or to reward it for its obedience to the supreme law. And as national adversity came through the operation of foreign powers, these were thus brought into the Divine purposes, as instruments to the same grand end. So that Yaweh's sphere of power was gradually extended over other peoples and their gods; and he became thus the Lord of Lords, the God above all gods, in the view of the earliest Prophets. A pure Monotheism is not yet reached, but a Henotheism, with the universalizing attribute of ethical character which will inevitably lead, in the later Prophets, to a complete ethical Monotheism. Israel's historical discipline, especially in the Babylonish Captivity, served to destroy the false synthesis of righteousness and worldy prosperity, and, at the same time, to throw the pious heart back upon the eternal righteousness of God, by which there was aroused a faith and a hope in the future ideals of goodness, to which the Holy Will of God pressed on, through and by means of all historic changes, to the coming kingdom, when joy and peace and righteousness should cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. This historic compulsion of taking refuge, amid disaster and loss, in the ethical character of God, universalized the religion of the Prophets, inasmuch as moral requirements transcend national limits and apply equally to all men and all nations. The deep ethical nature of the Prophets led them, by the lessons of history and personal experience, to identify the moral Ideal with yaweh, in whom to trust was indeed salvation, individual and national. A masterly presentation of this

religious development may be found in the critical works of Kuenen, (National Religions and Universal Religions, Hibbert Lectures,1882; or The Religion of Israel, Eng. Trans. 3 vols. Williams & Norgate, London.)

This ethical theism, while having the core of the true doctrine of God and the world, yet lacked what the Greek mind could add of truth and beauty; as may be seen in the practices of its Puritan successors, who have ever been too prone to disparage the worth of science and art. But, in itself, as an ethical theism, it had not yet reached its full realization, and waited its consummation in some nobler living voice. As with the lofty idealism of Plato, there wanted a successor to work it out along the line of its true development; so with the religion of the Prophets, there was, at any rate for many generations, no successor to bring it out into its full religious import. There really followed a crowd of interpreters and critics, who naturally formed themselves into a favored class, with the inevitable tendency of identifying the divine word of revelations with their own interests, and who, raising God more and more into an exaltedness above the world of men, must of necessity introduce as a mediating principle, an elaborate ceremonial cult, or a semi-divine angelology. The former tendency resulted in the written and oral ceremonial law. The latter showed itself in the Wisdom - Literature of the Jews, both in and out of the canon, wherein Wisdom, rising to personified being, becomes the mediator between God and his creation and its government. This doctrine of Wisdom, found

in germ in the Proverbs, in Job, in Jesus Sirach, and in the Pseudo-epigraphy in general, came to its fullest expression in the philosophy of the Alexandrian Jew, Philo. With him, God is not to be thought of in an anthropomorphic way, but is without attributes and exalted above all conceptions and names. We can only know <u>that</u> he is, not <u>what</u> he is, as the existing One, and the cause of all being. He does not come into immediate contact with the world, but acts upon it through other powers which are combined in the divine Logos, "the image of the first-born Son of God, the mediator of its creation and government, and of all the revelations of God in sacred history." Here then at Alexandria, at the centre of Hellenistic culture, we find a synthesis of Platonic Idealism and Hebrew Wisdom; and we can also see the possibilities for Christian theology, which show themselves subsequently in the labors of the great Alexandrian Presbyter, Athanasius.

Contemporaneously with this Hellenistic development of religious thought, there came, in the fullness of time, the realization in living form of the Hebrew Prophets' faith and hope; not, indeed, just in the way they expected it, but in a more real and vital way. Jesus Christ accepted the holy and just God of the Prophets, and proclaimed him to be the Heavenly Father of all men. He did not lower the exaltedness of the Divine Righteousness, nor remit in the least the changeless rigor of the supreme command to a holy life, but to the unchanging justice of God, he added the infinite love of the Heavenly Father, who shows his merciful and provident care for

every man, by stooping to reveal his Good Tidings to the poor, to heal the sick, comfort the mourner, forgive the sinful; and thus, by a display of his condescending love, to lead erring man up to the realization of himself, as the son of the Highest.

Moreover, he spanned the gulf which had yawned between the ideal and the actual for both ~~the~~ Jewish and Greek thought, which had sought a mediation in artificial and unreal conceptions, by sanctifying the whole world of nature, in using its natural operations, as the symbolic representations of the Divine teaching. God is not too high to forget the sparrow's fall, or the needs of the flowers, and as he works from day to day in all the forces of nature, and in the heart of man; so he works in the purposive realization of his Kingdom among men. His Kingdom is already present, it is already at hand; its temporal unfolding is to be realized, as man comes slowly to accept its truth and to realize that truth in his life. Thus, if a man would enter the kingdom, he must do as his natural impulses lead him to do when he has found the pearl of great price, that is, sell all that he may obtain it; if he would apprehend the higher truth, it must be by opening the inner eye and ear; if he would enter the Divine life, he must be born into it, as he is born into this; if he would rise to the fruition of holy living, like the seed cast into the ground, he must die, in order to live again in an exalted life; if he would seek atonement with God, he must with sincere repentance leave his prodigal follies and sins and return to his Father's house, where there is not only bread and enough to spare, and where he is sure

of the waiting Father's forgiving welcome; and so throughout all of his teachings, Jesus shows us the truth and beauty of nature in its spiritual meaning. He truly came down from heaven, and brought God and religion with him. The eternal good of the supreme God he indissolubly united to the truth and beauty of the natural world. He naturalized God, he spiritualized nature, and , in this, his Gospel stands in violent contrast with all other religious conceptions, in that, while they present abstract and non-natural views, his peculiar mark is simple naturalness that appeals directly to the heart of man. "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." Moreover, the essential significance of his teaching is in violent contrast to the harsh and non-naturalistic representations of much in the subsequent ecclesiastical dogma. The Kingdom of God has taken root and spread in the world, not by means of academic theology, ecclesiastical and symbolic institutions, which have, rightly conceived, a not unimportant function; but often in spite of them, in so far as the Divine words of Jesus, in their simple concrete natural force, have dwelt in the hearts of men, as the light and life that enlightens and enlivens every man that cometh into the world. Not only is the spirit and genius of ecclesiastical dogma foreign to the spirit and genius of Jesus, but it obscures him, in proportion as the church lays her chief stress upon it, and not upon any divine right of sonship with God, of which truth theology must always be the servant and not the master. And the more Jesus is seen in his simple naturalness, the more he will be seen in his sublime supernaturalness, as greater

than the church, higher than theology, broader than Christianity, and destined to accomplish his chosen mission, as the true Logos of God, of bringing the poorest and sinfulest up to their true, natural selves as sons of God. The supernatural, in the teachings of Jesus, consists in the truth that God is transcendent to nature as its supreme creator, lawgiver, and governor; the natural, in his teaching, is the truth that God is also immanent in the world, working from day to day and using it as an object lesson of his divine purpose concerning man.

Man is also supernatural, in that he rises above the nature of the world to find his true end in the complete development of himself in God, which end is but a realization of his true nature. In consequence of which, as long as he chooses to remain below it, he lives in sin, or at least is sinful, and thereby, in so far, does not fulfil the natural purposive working of God concerning him, as the world of nature below him does . The whole of Christ's teaching sounds the continual theme, Be true to your nature, as the grain of corn is true to its nature. In this symbolic utterance, we have what is generally called the supernatural doctrine of regeneration; die, that you may live again, but which is really a natural doctrine, and which lies at the basis of man's total progressive development.

(The preceding historical sketch is based on Pfleiderer's Philosophy and Development of Religion, Vol. 1, chap IV. Gifford Lectures, 1894, to which the reader is referred for a clearer and fuller account.)

With the developments of Christian theology, in which the histor-

ical Jesus becomes the eternal Logos, fitting into a synthesis of Jewish theology and Greek philosophy, we are not now concerned. In this development, it may be shown that much is gained, but it is also evident that much was lost, on the side of the true conception of the natural and supernatural. For example, after the Council of Nice, Jesus who, in his own life, had brought God so near to man, became himself exalted so high, in his eternal divinity, that there was needed, after the fashion of the Platonic world-soul, or, more nearly, after the manner of the apocryphal hierarchy of angels, some immaculate virgin and a whole calendar of holy saints. Later, in Protestant theology, while the mediating machinery of the poetic imagination was swept away, and Jesus brought again near to man, speculative thought constructed a new, notional machinery in which, taking Augustine's doctrine of election and reprobation, theology made salvation turn upon a mediation between divine justice and divine love, planned in the councils of the Trinity, and accomplished in history, by the sacrifice of pain. Thus the simple naturalness of Jesus was replaced by a supernaturalistic speculation. How foreign this is to the mind and spirit of Jesus, may be seen by trying to imagine Augustine or Calvin giving their lectures upon the Mount or by the Sea of Galilee.

Thus far, in hasty outlines, we have before us the general conceptions of both classical and Jewish antiquity, regarding God and the world, the supernatural and the natural. Both with the Greeks and Hebrews, the development starts from naïve popular beliefs. The advance in

one case, is made by intellectual reflection, in the other, by ethical intuition. The former ran off into abstract Pantheistic conceptions, or, restrained by ethical demands, attained to the lofty idealism of Plato, truly great in its central thoughts, but vitiated by a dualistic conception of God and the world. The latter reached an imperfectly developed ethical theism, in the Prophets, which was misunderstood and distorted by the Rabbinic schools, or, rationalized under the influence of Platonic thought, suffered from the Platonic dualism, in the philosophical theology of the Alexandrian Philo.
But out of Hebraism, along the line of the true prophetic development, there arose what may be truly called the revelation of the Father in Jesus Christ, who brought God down to the world of nature, divinizing it, as an expression of Holy Will and Holy Love, and, raising man up to a view of his true nature, as a son of God; thus uniting the truth, as it is, with the good, as it ought to be. This was presented in the doctrine of a growing kingdom of righteousness, the eternal truths of which, are ever present to God, but future to man, as the goal toward which his inner divine nature must ever aspire, and, in the attainment of which, he alone reaches his true self. But as complete as this is as an expression of the ethical intuition, and so satisfactory for the religious nature, it yet must give some account of itself to the reason, and thus harmonize with the demands of speculative thought. Now, lest we should be too confident of results beforehand, we should warn ourselves that speculation, alone, may not perhaps reach the ethical theism of Jesus, in the fullnes of its content, and

thus prove it in the ordinary sense of the term; yet we can expect that the rational understanding will not contradict it, on the one hand, and, on the other, will point to it as the only ground upon which its own rational processes can rest.

B.

This synthesis between the demands of the intellectual nature and the ethico-religious nature, between the true and the good, we must look for, if it be found at all, in modern thought. After the rise and conquest of Christianity, the rational interests of man were absorbed in a one-sided theological philosophy, Patristic and Scholastic. Not until the Renaissance, did the mind shake itself free from traditional bonds and assert its independent rights, in a new science and a new philosophy. Nature had come to be recognized as the abode of all evil and sin. Manicheism was the universal doctrine, theoretically and practically. The celibacy of the clergy and monasticism were the perpetual object lessons of the church, that the world ~~that it~~ was to be utterly despised; the natural world was the work of the devil, or, at any rate, wholly given over to his control, while the supernatural heaven was alone worth striving for. The Renaissance changed all this. And it was no more than could be expected that man, so long shut out from the beautiful garden of the Lord, over which he had been originally set, should, by a violent revulsion of feelings, rush intemperately into the enjoyments of the

present beautiful world, which ever seemed to spread an abundant feast before him. Practically, the Italian Humanists carried their ethics to the wildest eudemonistic limits; theoretically, the mind of man turned itself with an awakened vigor to learn from nature the truth of her ways. The immense importance of this movement, for human thought, cannot well be overestimated.

Two directions were taken. Descartes looked inward, for a basal undoubted proposition with which to begin a new philosophy. Copernicus looked outward, to establish a new science for the visible universe. What philosophy could do for thought soon came to a stand still, in the pantheistic monism of Spinoza. Yet this had been done, and could not be undone. The conception of the universe was gained as a harmonious order and system, governed by law, and based on the nature of the Infinite. The relation of the Infinite to the finite, and the synthesis of freedom and necessity Spinoza did not reach.

What science could do for thought was endangered by the empiricism of Locke, which Hume followed to its logical conclusions, only to find that all the categories, under which science worked, are but figments of the mind, and so unreliable; while the outer world itself comes to us as bundles of sensuous impressions which, have only phenomenal worth. Thus man and the world came near to being lost altogether. Yet this very nescience asserted the outer world of experience, and science clung to the conviction that nature was worthy of stud y for

lessons of the deepest import to man.

A grand synthesis was necessary wherein the world of thoughts and the world of things should have their mutual rights. The subject must not be lost in the object, sinking to the level of a mere resultant of objective forces; nor must the object lose itself in the subject, becoming a mere swirl of subjective phantoms. In the one case, we have nihilism, in the other, solipsism. If knowledge is to have any rational meaning, science and philosophy any worth, subject and object must abide, each in its own divine right, and both in a reciprocal harmonious interaction. The great mediator arose in Kant who, although he did not fully understand or carry out his grand mission, at any rate, gave to the subject an abiding existence and function, and asserted the necessity of a real causal object,—while he did not yet rightly conceive the power of the subject to know it. It is true that Fichte could press the Kantian nescience to the conclusion of an absolute idealism; but it is also true that Lotze, starting from Kant's real subject, could bring his unknown thing-in-itself into the range of knowledge as a real object, by taking Leibnitz's individualistic monadology, and constructing it into a harmonious system of reciprocal activities in the causal Infinite, accessible to the knowing subject, as objective reality. Thus we have in Lotze's idealistic realism, based on the Kantian theory of knowledge and the Leibnitzian monadology, the best solution, up to the present time, of mind and matter, subject and object, and the mutual relations existing between them.

It becomes evident that the pivotal position, on which the whole problem turns, is the Kantian epistemology; it is also evident that, when the process of the knowing mind is examined, it is necessary to deal with the metaphysical question as to the nature of that which is known; What must the objective world be, in order to be known? This does not mean that we can go behind being to learn how it came into existence, to know what is its ultimate nature, or to represent it to our imagination; but that we are to form some notion of what substantial reality is, how it acts, and how we come to know it, and its acts. In discussing this problem, we shall deal only with those phases of it that have reference to the most rational views, concerning the natural and the supernatural. Hence, there will be needed some doctrine of God, of Man, and of the World, and their relations, one to the other. It is true that, in the use of these three terms, there is expressed already a provisional conclusion, implying three realities, the existence of which all classes of thinkers by no means admit, and which, at the start, will not be asserted; but they have, in the universal consciousness, a generally definite meaning, and will serve as starting points for a discussion that has to determine their worth to thought.

The line of proce dure here will be, to gain some notion of the World, of Man, and of God, and their relations; and then, in the light of the result, to form a rational conceptio n of the natural and the supernatural.

I.

With the rise of genuine scientific study, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the application of strict mathematical determinations to the phenomena of nature, there began, in the history of thought, the most productive results for the correct understanding of the visible universe, Bacon's Novum Organon expressed a universal tendency of the European mind rather than created it. Nature must be examined in all her ways, without bias or prejudice, and therefrom must be gathered, with all due obedience to fact, true knowledge concerning her. This new and rational method was earnestly and indefatigably applied by men of genius, whose brilliant successes have made their names historic. The forces and changes of nature, which had been looked upon as a chaos of warring elements, or as directed by hostile supersensuous spirits, gradually fell into the harmonious order of law. Astrology became astronomy, alchemy rose into chemistry, physics was erected into an exact mathematical science, under which heat, light, and electricity were united into a correlated harmony; the earth, by an application to its history of current modes of activity, with which we are familiar, revealed a slow and orderly development under the control of general laws; and, finally, organic life was found to follow an exact and uniform process of development. In short, nature came to be looked upon as a mechanism, composed of numberless inter-related and inter-

acting forces, that proceed in the order of invariable laws, thus constituting a harmonious whole, in which every element finds its dependent and necessitated place. The universal application of this mechanical view of the world was, at the beginning of our century, resisted on behalf of organic nature, in which, it was claimed, there worked vital impulses, directing each organism in its changeful development. But it became clearer, on further observation, since animals and plants do not create their own substances or establish the chemical and physical laws, reghant in matter, that organisms are the result of the elements composing them, uniting in obedience to inexorable physical and chemical laws. The indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, the persistence of force, the invariable connection of events under the universal sway of causation, are some of the deepest convictions of our own age, and these are united into a harmonious view of nature, which has produced the clearest and most satisfactory results. Hence, it is thought that organisms are not the product of vital impulses or formative ideas, inherent in them, "but result from the combination of forces inherent in the constituent elements, which proceed with an unvarying and ever identical mode of operation, governed at every moment by necessary general laws." They are not guided by an end, but are driven from behind, by the course of natural proce dure, and connected in a mesh of mutual relations which invariably compel like results from ~~result xx from~~ like conditions. Thus we have, as a conception of

nature, a mechanism, composed of things, mutually interacting according to laws, which are comprehended under one system, constituting a harmonious whole. With this view, then, science looks upon each combination in nature, whether it be a pebble or a man, as the necessary result of interacting things, driven by uniformly changeless laws.

Now there is left open the question as to the origin of these combinations, of the things and forces that produce them, and of the uniform orders of procedure or laws, that go to make up the whole system. The question of the origin of the things and their forces may be summarily dismissed by asserting that they are eternal. The doctrines of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy lead to the conclusion that matter and motion have always existed, and will always exist, and so the function of science is to deal with their redistribution. But the question still presses: How do things and forces come to a vast harmonious cosmical arrangement in which, however much we may fail to understand the design or general plan of procedure, we do see, from the minutest up to the mightiest interaction, a mutual adjustment or adaptation that has all the marks of purposive intelligence?

Two answers may be given. The cosmos may be referred to chance, for which no reason can be offered; and thus the question is given up, or answered in a way that makes the present universe an impossible enigma. For if order and law are the outcome of chance, so must be

truth and science in general, and, consequently, no dependence can now be placed on any conclusions we may draw, because they may, at any moment, be annulled by irrational chance. And even if it be claimed that, now that chance has struck on this happy outcome, we are assured, by reason of this present established order, of the permanent validity of our conclusion, it must be replied that something, then, other than chance has been introduced into the system to warrant this belief; for, in chance, there is no more reason for order than disorder, and no reason for the continuance of either. Or, secondly, the cosmos may be referred to the power and wisdom of a divine spirit; and yet in such a way, that every process and product of it, as well as the whole, is a result of necessary inexorable laws. All changes among things are the necessary ongoings of cause and efect. What is, is the necessary result of what was, and what is to be, is necessarily conditioned by what now is.

II.

Nothing stands in the way of the acceptance of this view, in its completeness, except the consciousness of our own personality, and our unwillingness to view our life, with all its power of thought, emotion, aesthetic and moral activity, as a part of this vast unconscious necessitated mechanism. But this protest, on the basis of our personality, may be due to an illusive error that must be laid aside, as many illusions have had, heretofore, to be laid aside. The past and even present consciousness of personality, in the popular

mind, by wider surveys and broader experiences, is reduced to dim and narrow limits. The development of the mental life is shown to be due to general laws, objective to the individual; and, much that was attributed to the individual personality, has been reduced under the mechanical functions of the body which, in all its activities, is under the complete sway of mechanical laws. And even when the personality takes its stand upon the consciousness of freedom in moral action, statistics have been cogently presented, to show that an average of crime is apparently a requirement of the general economy of nature, as much as a general average of temperature, with the conclusion that mechanism rules also in the moral life. There are those who have reached this conviction with some exultation, that the soul, the personal ego, is a composite result of physical elements united, it must be admitted, in a peculiar way, but always the outcome of material combinations, under the control of mechanical and necessary laws. As a consequence, with the disintegration of the organism, the seemingly unitary life of the personality, with its thoughts, feelings, and volitions, likewise falls away into its mechanical elements.

Many others, however, have withdrawn from this uninviting conclusion and have maintained, while admitting the universal mechanism of nature, including the human body, a belief in the peculiar nature of of the conscious self-identical ego, as a real being over against the necessitated unconscious course of things. Aside from any the-

oretical reasons, this latter conclusion has been the universal conviction of the race, as expressed in the word "soul"; and, allowing for all the errors that may arise from popular estimates and delusions, it indicates the existence of some strong ground, in the nature of the thing, and, hence, cannot be set aside without the most convincing scientific proofs. Such proofs have not yet been given, and those that have been offered are based on false and misleading analogies. On the contrary, the most cogent reason may be offered for the essential validity of the popular belief, although such reasons may not be properly presented or estimated by the mind of the majority. Two lines of argument may be taken to show that mental phenomena are based upon a peculiarity of nature, which is outside of the mechanical plexus. 1st. An empirical consideration of the testimony of consciousness; and 2nd. A presentation of the theory of knowledge. These two lines of argument, it must be admitted, are based on the proclamations of consciousness itself; but we should never forget that, upon the facts supplied by the conscious self, all arguments are based, whether scientific, speculative, or practical. By the very nature of things, we are shut up to the concrete events of consciousness, and to the laws which it demands shall be applied to all explanation and thought whatsoever.

1. Taking up the first line of argument, we find three main characteristics by which the mental life seems to be most unquestionably differentiated from the whole course of nature. These have been presented with such clearness and cogency by Lotze, that an abstract

his argument
of ^ will be given here. (See Microcosmos, Bk. II cap.1. Metaphysics, Bk.III, cap. 1.)

i. First, then, is the freedom of internal self determination, of which experience seems to give us direct and indisputable proof, in contrast to the unbroken chain of necessity among phenomena. This, however, must be confessed to be the least satisfactory mark of all, although the ordinary view considers it the most unequivocal. Although the worth of our spiritual existence seems to demand that our being be set free from mechanical constraint, yet reflection will show that freedom forms no observable fact of our inner life, or that our opinion of its value is always the same. Self inspection, it is true, often reveals no determining motive for our inner action, but our self-examination may be very fragmentary and incomplete, so that what appears to be a free self determination, may prove, on further analysis, to have constraining ground.
That our psychic reactions, upon external impressions, do not correspond to them either in amount or in time, and that the same outer impulse occasions, at various moments, the most various inner manifestations does not help the case for self determination. For it is just such disparity and incalculableness of antecedent and consequent, that is common to all interaction, inorganic as well as organic, and furnishes no mark of ''release from the thralldom of activity according to law, but is, on the contrary, the true idea of that activity itself''. When we consider the nature of reciprocal action between

mutually related elements, we shall see that ''Nowhere does an active cause transfer the effect complete to the element which it affects, so as to receive back the mere echo of its own action.'', but that the causal impression simply arouses to action ''the peculiar nature of that on which it is made, and the form of the event to come is determined equally by this, and by the peculiar energy which its presence awakens in that which is affected by it''. Sometimes we are well enough acquainted with the nature of the object affected that we can clearly trace every step of the process of the reaction between the initial impulse and the effect; but more frequently we only know the causal shock and the last reaction, while all the intermediate links are either very obscure or entirely hidden from view. More especially is this true of mental reactions, where only the initial and final forms of the event come under clear observation, so that the great complexity and obscurity of intermediate changes make the reaction still more unlike the excitation, and easily persuades us, the more strongly of the freedom of uncaused self-determination.

Suppose then that we admit, that the reasoning is erroneous that rests the denial of the thorough-going determinedness of mental life on the fact, that it cannot always be traced out, we shall then perhaps ''try to retain freedom as a necessary consequence of ethical truths or an imperative condition of the fulfillment of moral obligations.'' This conclusion, however, is not universally accepted,

and, moreover, it is by no means always clear that this unconditional freedom is "helpful or needful to the satisfaction of the moral cravings". All thinkers have not considered it indispensable, and every solution so far has lacked "that clearness, necessary to a thought fitted to form the basis of an important view". It must be observed here, that these considerations refer only to the freedom of the will, not to the freedom of the inner life generally; for, on all hands, it is admitted that the train of our ideas, feelings, and desires, follow universal laws and belong to the domain of mechanical necessities. And certainly, at this stage of our inquiry, "the evident prevalence of universal law, in the greater part of our inner life, can only be adverse to belief in the freedom, in a smaller part, which we cannot observe". But, on the other hand, just as little does experience convince us of its non-existence, and those who confidently assert mechanism of the total mental life, by urging the unbroken connection between mental phenomena and corporeal changes, "arbitrarily and erroneously interpret a familiar fact when they think to find in it a proof that everything in mind is explicable from properties of the matter with which it is united". All admit the dependence of mental states on external impressions, and the reciprocal action between the inner and outer worlds. Our sensations, feelings, and volitions, vary with external influences or the vital activities of the body. Our physical condition greatly affects the vividness and activity of thought or the strength of moral purpose.

"But, after all, these facts prove only that the changes of physical elements represent a set of conditions, on which the existence and character of our internal states necessarily depend; they do not prove that such changes are the single and sufficient cause from which, in virtue of its own energy and without the cooperation of a quite different principle, the manifold variety of psychic life is exclusively evolved." Further on, in another connection, it is shown that our difficulties here may be resolved by seeing how a combination of freedom and mechanism is consistent with the nature of the soul, as we know it in experience. At any rate, up to this point, the discussion of free will has shown that its bearings are not as clear and unambiguous as the popular mind supposes.

Had it been within the range of his present purpose, Lotze might have proceeded to give a metaphysical consideration of the subject, with two bearings. First, he might have pointed out the distinction between a rational motive, as the ground for the choice of an intelligent being, and a compulsive cause, beyond our consideration or control, or outside of the nature of the subject. The very nature of free intelligence carries with it the need of reasonable grounds to action. Secondly, he might have shown that the intelligent pursuit of truth, beauty, and goodness necessarily implies, by the conscious avoidance of their opposites, the power of free activity. Of course, the soul is necessitated by its nature which is rational and regulated, not irrational and unregulated. The soul moves consciously toward the full development of its ideal state,

and it does so, by the free choice of means as it comes to see more and more clearly its true goal. And it becomes freer and freer as it enters more fully into the lawful sway of its ideal, but more and more restrained and necessitated as it capriciously or ignorantly withdraws from this, the highest law of its being.

ii. In the second place, Lotze goes on to show that the chasm between the apparently sufficient reason of physical antecedent and its alleged psychic consequent is seen in the incomparability of the two elements. "All that occurs in external Nature or in our own body as determinations of extension, composition, density, motion, and the like can in no way be compared with the peculiar character of sensations, feelings, volitions, which, as a matter of fact, we find succeeding to them and erroneously believe to arise from them." However refined the movement of sense excitation in the nerves may become, it has no reason in itself why it should cease as movement and become color, taste, or sound. This chasm between the last physical stage of sense impression, and the rise of sensation has never been bridged, nor can it ever be hoped that it will be. On this absolute incomparability of physical antecedent and psychic consequent, has always rested the conviction that a special ground of explanation for psychic life is needed.

Of course, it must be recognized that science should group as many different phenomena as possible under a single principle, but it is no less binding to trace back that which happens to that on which it depends;" and the craving for unity must give way to the recognition of plurality of different sources, when the facts of experience do not entitle us to derive different things from one and the same origin." Hence, the scruple of unity

must not stand in the way of our accepting, for the two distinct groups of physical and psychical phenomena, grounds of explanation equally distinct and independent. The legitimate demand for unity requires merely the combination under one principle of those elements that superficially appear separated; we might require that the various fundamental principles spring from the same root independently, but not necessarily from one another.

The discussion of the common origin of the physical and the psychical belongs to another place. Here, insistence is made on distinct grounds of explanation for phenomena that cannot be compared. This demand is the same made in dealing with the phenomena of Nature. When the results of some active element can not be traced back to the nature of that element or its form of movement, we must look for the ground of this effect in some second element. Thus the explosion of gunpowder cannot be accounted for by the nature or movement of the applied spark. The nature of the powder is the cause of the familiar form of reaction observed, and the spark is only the final necessary completing condition. In like manner, we conclude with reference to material states and their mental results. "However indissolubly the latter are associated with the former as their conditions, they must yet have the ground of their form in another principle, and anything that we can conceive as an energy or efficacy of matter, instead

of producing mental life itself, only occasions its manifestations by stimulating to expression a differently constituted element.''

We must here more narrowly define our inference of two grounds of explanation. Because two such grounds are necessary for the explanation of the two different groups of phenomena, it does not follow that these grounds belong to different kinds of being. In short, may not matter have in addition to its outward properties a store of inner life, from which all observed mental phenomena are derived? However, an unequivocal affirmative answer to this question would not help us out any. ''For this feeling and willing substance would remain a double being'' and its two sides would ever remain incomparable. ''It would go through two courses of development, from neither of which could there be conceived a transition to the other.'' There may be a correspondence of the two sides in their mutual interactions, by which the material side could stir the mental side to action, but the latter could not be derived from the former as an effect from an efficient cause.

This view, while it has a justification, in its antagonism to intuitionism, no more helps us to see how the mental senses depend on the material senses in the unity of a substance acting on itself, than ''the supposition of a reciprocal action between two different subjects.''

While in another place and with a different application, this

uniting of internal and external phenomena into the same reality, may prove to be a movement of thought in the right direction, here, at any rate, it appears to be unfruitful.

iii. The third mark, that distinguishes mind from matter, must now be considered. "We must single out, as the decisive fact of experience that compels us, in the explanation of mental life, to put in the place of matter an immaterial form of being as the subject of phenomena, that Unity of Consciousness without which the sum-total of our internal states could not even become the objects of self-observation". As misconceptions have gathered about the term Unity of Consciousness the author is careful to make clear his use of the expression. So far as man and the higher animals are concerned, experience does not suggest that more than one soul animates each living form. In the lower classes of the animal kingdom, however, this fact does not hold. There, by artificial section, by fission, and generation, it appears that there are several independent beings with their own psychic qualities in the same organic mass. But this does not invalidate the unity of consciousness, for "the unity of consciousness does not mean that the number of beings animating an organic form is limited. Indeed, it must be admitted that if a soul, in any sense, belongs to the severed part of a polyp, the unity of consciousness holds good of that as well as of our own personality.

To define more precisely, it may be said, we come to understand the connection of our inner life only by referring all of its events to the one ego, lying unchanged alike beneath its simultaneous variety and its temporal succession''. Retrospection of our experiences, brings with it the image of the ego as the combining center, and our feelings and thoughts have meaning to us ''only as its states or energies, not as events floating unattached in a void''. Yet we are not always referring the manifold internal experiences to the ego; this unifying power of the ego is realized only when our concentrated attention is brought to bear on mental phenomena in reflection. The feelings, impressions, ideas that float through the mind are not referred always to the unity of our nature; they do not have the order and sequence of rational thought, and, often, impressions remain whose origin or efficient cause we cannot recall. ''Hence the unity of consciousness spoken of can not mean that we have a persistent consciousness of the unity of our being, and the inferences which it has been attempted to draw from this assumption are for us inept''.

However, from the body of facts thus noticed, it is not difficult to infer from the nature of consciousness, the unity of a being conscious of itself. ''For it is not necessary and imperative that, at every moment and in respect to all its states, a being should exercise the unifying efficiency put within its power

by the unity of its nature.'' Our conclusion to its unity is valid,if it possesses the unifying efficiency to be exercised when the attention is aroused. Indeed, even if it can be exercised only rarely, or to a limited extent, or only once, the inference to the indivisibility of this being is imperative. Further, let it be acknowledged, that many internal states are unconnected; it follows that our knowledge of such unconnectedness is comprehensible only on the supposition of the unity of cognitive being. For, although at the time of a sense perception, we may be wholly merged in the sensation so that no reference is made to the unity of the conscious ego, it follows that such a fact could never be a matter for subsequent reflection or astonishment, if the sensation, in some way at the moment of its rise, had not belonged to the unity of our being and been restrained by it. In reflection, we look upon the sensation as always having been connected with our ego and in this very possibility of subsequent concentration there is constraining ground for holding it to be real.''

A misconception of this claim must here be removed. It is not claimed that our consciousness of the unity of our being is in itself, by what it directly reports, a guarantee of that unity. Of course, it might be objected plausibly, that as many convictions which seem irresistibly cogent to the unsophisticated mind prove fallacies to riper reflection, so,too, this unity of the ego may be merely the form in which our own being appears to itself. So that

necessarily
our being is not, an indivisible unity, because we seem such to ourselves, anymore than the true nature of a thing is inferred from its appearance. But this scruple does not ~~does not~~ touch the question in hand "For our belief in the soul's unity rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, but on our being able to appear to ourselves <u>at all.</u>" We might appear very much different than we do to ourselves, but that would not invalidate our inference of unity of being, based on the bare possibilities of appearing anything to ourselves. "What a being appears to itself to be is not the important point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or other things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature."

We must avoid playing fast and loose with the notion of appearance. We often content ourselves with contrasting appearance with the being that appears and "forget that the appearance is impossible without another being that sees it. Appearance is not a real lustre streaming forth from the hidden depths of being-in-itself, it is rather the reaction of the cognitive soul upon the stimulation of things." It can not exist independently of consciousness "And of consciousness, -- of this general capacity that makes the appearance of anything possible, -- we maintain that it can be an attribute only of the individual unity of one being, and that every attempt to ascribe it to a plurality however bound together, will, by its failure, but confirm our conviction of the su-

persensible unity of the soul. ''

The position now reached would hardly seem to need further proof. But the author turns aside for a moment to meet the oft-repeated and confident assertion that consciousness is simply the natural resultant of the reciprocal action of many elements and their states. The question considered is; ''How far such a production of the one out of the many is possible?''

The analogy most relied upon is that of the composition of several motions in space into a common resultant. Two motions, we'll say, of different directions and velocities uniting to produce a third simple motion, in which no trace of the antecedent diversity is found, furnishes a perfect example of the rise of the unity of consciousness, from a variety of elemental mental motions. But in this illustration, there is overlooked just the essential point of the theorem, viz: that the two motions spoken of are motions of one and the same indivisible molecule, at one and the same moment. It is this indivisible subject, on which the motions act, that makes the resultant possible.

Again, let us imagine a number of atoms combined, in any way whatever, so that they can obey only in concert any impetus to motion. Now, if this whole group moves along a straight line, its motion will be merely the sum of the identical motions of its several parts. Yet it is going too far to speak of a sum of motions. It is rather a repetition of the same process, as many

times as there are atoms in motion, so that these distinct motions form neither a sum nor a whole. They become such only under one of two conditions, (a) Either these separate motions will all be transferred to one and the same indivisible subject, thus constituting the unity of a state whose subject is the element. But, at the same time, the character of the event will be changed from a group of many motions to the simple motion of a unit.

(b) Or else, the several motions, without being confounded will be related one to the other, and brought, as an abiding plurality, under the notion of unity, in the indivisible consciousness of a single observer. If, further, we suppose "another system of atoms, more loosely connected together and engaged in motions of varying velocities and directions, we should still have to speak of a total motion of the system only in the second sense". Even if we thought of the final resultant of this system of motions as being transferred to a single unifying element, this last would not be the same as the total motion of the system, for in the simplicity of the resultant would have disappeared many of the constituent elements of the manifold. Only in the concentrating thought of the observer is this manifold as a whole actualized in unity. "There alone does the past cohere with the present and the future, in reality, the one <u>is</u>, when the other is <u>not</u>; only in that thought does any beauty of form, any fulness, and any significance of development truly exist, for only in it properly consist those

relations of the one to the other, on which all such merits depend. " In reality, each separate element works unconsciously of itself and others, and "all the operations of plurality either remain a plurality of separate operations, or become truly fused into one only when transferred to the unity of a being as its states".

Now it is just the nature of consciousness, by its indivisible unity, to render possible the union of many into the one, but "the unity of consciousness can never spring solely from the mutual action of the many". If now we transfer these illustrations to the body, everywhere pervaded by internal psychic life, it will become evident that either a system of uniform sensations, or a multitude of widely various sensations "will never coalesce into a joint sensation" or result in a consciousness of unity "unless we suppose, in addition to them, a favored being to which all transfer their states; and then that will be the soul of such a body." Again it must be noted, that the soul is not concluded to be one because we appear to ourselves a unity, but from the fact that anything can appear to us; and perhaps the argument on this point will be made clearer by bringing into prominence the distinctive character of consciouness, which has hitherto been tacitly assumed, by contrasting it with the ordinary conceptions of physical science which have been treated as applicable to the case in hand. Consciousness nowhere shows anything resembling what we see in nature, viz: the resultant of two forces producing, at one time, a state

of rest, at another, a third intermediate motion, in which they have become merged beyond recognition.'' Our impressions and ideas, through all changes, never merge into one another or blend into an indistinguishable whole, but retain their own individual peculiar content. Two impressions of color never mix to form a third; pleasure and pain never coalesce so as to form a neutral state. Only when external stimuli are blended, in the nervous tract, before reaching consciousness, do we have blended or neutral compound sensations, - as when colors in contact in space blend at their edges. But in consciousness, the colors are kept separate with their own individual character and are never blended into, for example, a common gray. In fact, it keeps separate those impressions that are different at the very moment when it seeks to combine them. It leaves to each its peculiar character and does not merge them, but ''moves comparing among them, and, at the same time, is aware of the amount and kind of transition by which it passes from the one to the other. It is in this act of relating and comparing, -- the rudiments of all judging, -- that we have what answers, in the wholly different mental sphere, to the composition of results in the material world; here, at the same time, lies the true meaning of the unity of consciousness''. From this relating and comparing activity, arise ~~arise~~ the ideas of an intensive more or less, of qualitative resemblance and difference, of identity, and so on; and such activity can hardly be thought of

by any one as performed by an aggregate plurality. The bond that unites the manifold and, as an active element, passes from one to another, leaving both in existence, while it is aware of the kind and direction of its own transition, can not itself be manifold, but must contain in itself a strict principle of unity. "The necessity of, first of all, seeking two distinct principles of explanation for two wholly dissimilar cycles of phenomena, shuts us off from any attempt to derive the inner life, as a self-evident result, from operations of material substances, in so far as material. The other necessity, -- recognition of the fact of the unity of consciousness and our discernment of the impossibility of producing that unity from the reciprocal action of any plurality whatever, -- left us no ground for expecting any help in the explanation of particular phenomena, even from the assumption of a secret psychic life in all that we call matter. We may , therefore, most simply state the result reached as yet in the traditional form of a separation of the supersensuous soul from the material body, no matter on what the the existence of the phenomenal appearance of the latter may itself depend." At the conclusion of his reflections on the soul, its nature, and its various activities, the author has to say;

"Among all the errors of the human mind, it has always seemed to me the strangest that it could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or to take it at

second hand as the product of an external nature we know only indirectly, only by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence.''

Having thus found by an empirical examination of consciousness, reason for believing that the soul is a distinct principle upon which to ground mental phenomena, and that it is not a resultant of physical elements or a function of matter, but a supersensuous reality, in intimate interaction with it, it is true, but to be clearly distinguished from it; we proceed to the second line of argument for the peculiar nature of the soul.

2. This is based on a consideration of the process of knowing. How do we come to know? This question may be answered naïvely, at once, by saying that knowing is a process by which truth is conveyed from the outer world into the empty and passive mind. This is essentially the doctrine of Locke. Or this view may be somewhat amended, as by modern sensationalists, in claiming that knowledge results from the various necessary combinations of simple sensations according to the law of association.

Or again, knowing may be looked upon as an activity in mind itself, by which, reacting upon external impulses, the mind, in accordance with its own laws and the demands of its own nature, constructs the objects of its own knowledge. This is the intutional view which was first clearly presented by Kant; and, to anticipate the outcome of the discussion on this point, it may be said

that no other view is possible, if we wish to retain either the mind or the objective world, or both.

To Locke must be given the credit of starting the problem of knowledge, which resulted, through the interposition of Hume, in Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason. In a discussion on morality and religion, with a few friends, Locke became aware of the mazes of difficulty in which the subject of the understanding was involved, and resolved to clear up the whole matter on ''one sheet of paper''. The attempt, however, involved nearly twenty years of thought and labor, while the ''one sheet'' grew into a volume. The result was, in short, that knowledge proved to be the product of experience which comes either from external sources or from the working of the mind itself. He sought to show that our most abstract thoughts, which seem to reach infinity, may be traced to one or other or both of these constituents. Our most ''complex ideas'' are all made up of ''simple ideas'' either from without or from the mind. That is, they are due to phenmena of which we are percipient in the five senses, or else due to reflection upon ''the operations of mind''. Even those thoughts which are ''most abstruse, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about objects of sense''. He examines by means of his ''historical

plain method'' our thoughts of space, time, infinity, power, substance, personal identity, causality and several others, and resolves their complex nature into either perceptions, of things external, through the five senses, or into perceptions of the operations of our own minds. Experiences which comes through the five senses he calls sensations, and those that come through the mind's action upon its own operations he calls reflections, which ''though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, is yet very like it and might properly be called internal sense''.

Here it will be noticed that there is an unclear conception of an inner activity of mind. Moreover, in sensations themselves there is a subjective element. For our sensations derived from things are partly revelations of external things themselves as they involve the mathematical relations of ''solidity, extention, figure, motion,'' and are quantitative rather than qualitative; and partly sensations, in the strict sense of the word, involved in the subjective impressions which are raised in us by contact with things. The former he calls primary qualities, which belong to matter in its externality, and would continue if all sentient beings ceased to exist; the latter he calls secondary qualities and are subjective, but depend, in a way he does not make clear, on determinations of the primary qualities.

These results of Locke's were vitiated by a misleading and

confused use of the word reflection; for when it is employed as analagous to "sense" it has one meaning, and when empowered with a combining, constructive ability, it has quite another which sometimes borders on the true conception of the mind, as having, by its own inherent right, rational tendencies and intellectual obligations."

His work was also vitiated by an unclear and naïve view of sense experience, in its artificial division of labor into primary and secondary. How such experience is at all possible he did not show. His modern sensationalistic followers, whether they be materialists or idealists, have the advantage over him in possessing a better physics and physiology, by which they break down primary and secondary qualities into subjective phenomenalism; but they fall far below him in substituting for his reflective power of mind, which has some valid rational elements inhering in it, their law of mechanical association, which has no rationality in it whatsoever.

Of the reality of the external world, Locke has no doubt; his problem had to do with the power of the understanding to gain a correct and valid knowledge of that world. As the mind had no innate ideas, or a priori notions, or universal constructive principles that by themselves could render knowledge valid, we must look to experiences of externality for all we can really know. In a word, the result of Locke's argument is this: secondary qual-

ities of sensation and the combination of all simple ideas by reflection are subjective; and hence, not being an exact transcript of the real world, can not be depended on as valid knowledge. Primary qualities, alone, correspond to reality. They bring to the empty mind an exact copy of substance, and so alone have objective reality. How this empiricism could be pressed in the French Clearing Up to the extreme logical result of materialism, and to the destruction of the foundations of all moral and religious life, is easily seen.

However, taking another direction in the severe logic of Hume, it aroused Kant to a rescue of the mind and of the objective validity of knowledge. But, pressing subjectivism too far, Kant fell into an irrational nescience, which Fichte, by a correct inference, resolved in his Absolute Idealism.

Thus we have the strange spectacle of thought, beginning in Locke, with all world and no mind; and, ending in Fichte, with all mind and no world. Between these extremes we may suppose the truth to lie.

Hume took Locke's empiricism in earnest and with rigor carried it out to its logical conclusion. He first fixes his attention on the conception of causality. In what sense do we know that two things stand in the relation of cause and effect? We cannot know it <u>a priori</u>, as such knowledge is analytical merely, and the effect is not contained in the cause; nor can we know it from ex-

perience, for experience reveals only the relation of succession in time. Hence we form the notion of causality, as a habit resulting from the experience of constant succession. Because we see one thing uniformly follow another, we get to think that the latter must follow. Thus the mind has imposed on the facts of experience its own subjective and unreliable notions. And so it is with all our notions of necessary relation. Consequently, our knowledge of the outer world consists of groups of impressions which can not be attributed to an underlying causal substance; and the ego itself becomes a string of sensations; for the claim of a substantial ground under either the outer or inner world is based on these notions of necessary relation which arise simply from the mind's tendency to feign. This complete scepticism, to which Hume had logically brought Locke's empiricism, aroused Kant, as he says, to a thorough-going examination of the process of knowledge.

Hume admitted the validity of mathematical knowledge, in as much as it is a priori; that is, each proposition is analytically expanded into its logical elements.

This Kant proved to be false, by showing that mathematics, though based on a priori conceptions, is synthetical as well as analytical. For example, the sum 12 is not contained in the proposition 7 + 5, from which it is analytically unfolded, but 7 + 5 will forever remain 7 + 5 until, by a synthetic act of the mind, they are united into the sum 12.

Proceeding from this discovery, that the mind, by a priori principles belonging to its own nature, constructively combines the facts presented to it, he made a complete analysis of the act of cognition, and came to a solution of how experience is possible, - a problem with which neither Locke nor Hume dealt.

Kant looked upon his own work as a revolution in philosophy, analogous to that change effected in astronomy by Copernicus. Instead of assuming with his predecessors, that "all our knowledge must regulate itself according to its objects," he would "try for once whether we do not succeed better with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that objects must be adapted to the nature of our knowledge." And so in his Critique of the Pure Reason, he presents those a priori, necessary, and universal, hence objective, principles which exercise their regulative and constructive functions upon the facts presented in sense - experience. What we know, then, does not come from experience, but is rather developed in experience, and is a product of the constructive principles, inherent in the nature of mind, applied to the material furnished by sense. Our knowledge of the world, or experience as it is commonly called, is made possible by what the cognitive faculty itself furnishes. Cognition comprises sense and understanding; sense furnishes the material and the understanding works it out into the clear objects of perception. Yet sense, or as Kant calls it, the aesthetic faculty, does not receive ready made external impressions, but brings into

the result its universal, a priori, pure conceptions of time and space which give to the sense impressions objectivity and order. Thought then takes up this material and, under the categories of the understanding, works them out into the rational world of experience as we know it.

This brief statement gives the essential core of Kant's Critique; and, without accepting his elaborate and, for the most part, artificial analyses, or his nescience, we may accept it as a final and ultimate service to the theory of knowledge. With our expanded knowledge of physics and psychology, we may state in a word the true process of knowledge.

Vibrations in the external media start some sort of physical action in the sense-nerves which, at some stage in the process, where and how we do not know, arouse the percipient self into those peculiar reactions we call sensations. But, as yet, these sensations exist in a chaos of coexistences and sequences; and before they can be called perceptions proper, it is necessary for the mind to compare, classify, and arrange them under the constructive categories of reason, such as causality, substance, unity, and the like, and to objectify them in space and time, as clear and complete objects in the external world.

Thus far we have simply the world of experience, and the process by which it is reached is seen to be unconscious and instinctive.

This, of course, does not constitute all of our knowledge, or

even the major part of it, for the mind then consciously takes up the process of reasoning and, in accordance with its rational laws, thinks upon the world of experience, its own intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious nature, its own meaning and destiny, and builds up the whole into an ordered, harmonious and invisible realm of rational ideas in which it lives and moves and has its being; and which, while it starts from the experiences of the visible world, soon deserts this narrow region and, in the totality of thought, in no way depends upon it.

This long and perhaps unnecessarily tedious presentation of mind, as establishing the true doctrine of man, is deemed justifiable in view of its central importance, implicit or explicit, in all discussions whatsoever. The mind furnishes all facts, makes all comparisons, passes all judgments, and estimates the worth of all efforts and ideas in art, science, and religion. Through its interpretative activities, must pass all things and all thoughts; and, in a very true sense, it constructs the world visible and invisible, in which it lives, acts, and thinks. Annul mind and you annihilate existence for man. For other orders of beings there may still remain real being, but without mind, not only man himself sinks into nothingness, but also his entire world with him.

To sum up what we have thus far gained: We have found the world or the material order, to be a vast mechanism, made up of interrelated, interdependent, interacting elements working together in a

harmonious system, under the guidance of necessary mechanical laws. Nothing is destroyed, nothing created, only matter and motion are redistributed under the invariable order of cause and effect.

So much for the world. What was the result of the argument for man? From the complete control of this necessary mechanism of nature, man instinctively withdraws himself as distinct from it. So far as his body is concerned, it matters not that it is merged in the uniform course of things; but as for his mind, the self-conscious ego, the citadel of his personality, it was thought too precious to sink to the level of a thing or combination of things, ever driven from behind and, in no way, able to assert itself as a free intelligence. This instinctive conviction could not be denied without the most convincing proofs. But, in the absence of such proofs, on the other hand, it was possible to show, on the most cogent rational grounds, the truth of the conviction. We found that the mind, in its own right, has a claim to substantial reality, above the mechanism and in distinction from it, by considering, first empirically, the sense of freedom, the incomparability of psychical and physical phenomena, and the unity of consciousness; and secondly, the process of knowledge in experience, and in mental activity generally.

In seeking for a true conception of the relation between man and the world, we must first examine the results that follow from the preceeding conclusions. We must say of naive realism; It can

not account for knowledge, because knowledge is a reaction of mind upon physical stimuli; and objective things, if they do exist as common sense pictures them, do not and indeed cannot come into consciousness. The result for sensationalism of every type, materialistic or idealistic is; Even if it be granted sensations to begin with, it can in no way get clear objects of experience, much less, proceed in a rational way, voluntarialy or involuntarialy, with them. Now, since by reason of the process of knowing, we have no need of naïve realism, as a metaphysic; and since, for the same reason, sensationalism proves to be impossible, as an epistimology, we are left with only some form of idealism as a metaphysic; and, so far as epistimology is concerned, intuitionism is the only basis on which experience is possible at all.

Having then the mind as a realty which, by its inherent constructive laws, interprets the world in terms of its own sensational reaction and rational forms, we have some reason to conclude to subjective idealism. Kant's desciple, Fichte, did, although the Critique was not intended to lead to that result. Kant asserted an objective ground, under the category of causation, for our subjective presentation, but he magnified subjectivity and minified objectivity to such an extent that the thing-in-itself passed beyond the range of knowledge altogether, so that Fichte consistently dropped it out of existence. For that cannot be saved to existence which is denied to knowledge, and Kant was inconsistent with

his own standpoint in his argument against idealism. But in spite of this inconsistency, by which we see Kant limiting causality to the phenomena of consciousness and yet leaping to the assertion of trans-subjective real causes, we must not conclude that his nescience was the gist and real object of his Critique. His sceptical doctrine was rather a conclusion pressed too far; and, if instead of taking Fichte's direction, we should assert the knowability of things-in-themselves, in so far as they are causes of our presentations, we should not be deserting Kant but correcting in him a false and one-sided inference, by means of his own fundamental doctrine of knowledge.

Suppose for the moment we take Fichte's direction to see what may be the outcome. Dropping the thing-in-itself as useless, our world of presentations becomes acts in ourselves. Does the cause of these acts also lie in ourselves? No, says Ficte, their ground is in the universal mind. Not to consider his wavering between universal mind, as an abstraction from individual minds and, as an Infinite intelligent entity, we ask; Are we any forwarder with the Universal mind, as cause for our presentations, than with things-in-themselves?

Aside from metaphysical considerations concerning the ground of the cosmos, which have no place here, and confining ourselves to the subjective process of knowledge, we must answer the above question in the negative. On epistimological grounds, we know no more of

the universal mind, as the causal condition of our presentations, than we do of the thing-in-itself. That is, if all our experience is only a subjective process, then the universal mind is as useless, as a causal object, as the thing-in-itself. To the objection that mind can only be thought of as communicating with or affecting our mind, it may be said, the thing-in-itself is not mere inert lumpishness, it too may be mental activity and thus be fitted to affect us.

So, then, if on the basis of the subjectivity of our knowledge, Ficte drops the thing-in-itself, he must, on the same basis, drop the universal mind, and reach a thorough-going solipsism, with the result that the whole objective world and God are simply presentations in us, which the mind, by its own creative nature, gives to itself. Indeed, on the present line of reasoning, with the logic of "possibilities", solipsism could be defended, even against that poser of "other persons".

But now let us grant the legitimacy of substituting the universal mind for the thing-in-itself, and thus abolish the so-called objective world as the ground of our presentations. We shall then have the Infinite mind working effects in our mind. Be it observed that here the subjective category of causality is considered as validly employed in giving us a trans-subjective world of some sort, whereas a true and consistent subjectivism, while granting causation, would find itself satisfied with subjective objects.

However, for the sake of the argument, we grant the right of assigning as an objective cause to our presentations which are effects in us, the Infinite mind which directly works in us. How, on this supposition, how shall we think through or rationalize our experiences? The whole world, including other men and our own bodies, which are presented to us as objective and other than ourselves, and which now do our will and now coerce us, must not now be considered objective at all, in the sense in which the mind asserts them to be objective, as other than itself, but only in the sense that God or the Infinite works the whole effect in us, including our irrepressible distinction of self and not-self. In so far, we must confess ourselves as deceived. If we instinctively say, there is an object in the outer world other than ourselves, we must rationally correct ourselves by saying there is not only no object as we think, but no outer world at all. And this perpetual correction of our misleading instincts, startles us with the suspicion that, if led by our idea of causation, we are always mistaken in the belief in objects other than ourselves, which are really only effects in us, we may, after all, be mistaken in looking for any objective cause at all in God or anywhere else, and so we straightway tumble into solipsism again.

But if we bravely stand by our belief in the Infinite intelligential cause, and correct our views as to the subjectivity and ob-

jectivity of the outer world, we must go on still further in our analyses of subjectivity. We have dreams in which the objects are effects in us, but these differ materially from the ideal objects of the outer world. Are these effects produced directly in us by the divine mind, or are they combinations we make ourselves of the genuine effects made by the divine mind? The latter alternative, the idealist asserts. So he would go on to say, we recognize in dreams and in fantasy the mind's own working, apart from the divine effects. In the case of the inebriate, who fleeing from an ideal dragon, knocks his head against a real door, he mistakes a false effect for a true one. We are then to think of a multitude of effects, perpetually worked in our minds; these constitute what we erroneously consider an objective world; the truth results when we allow these effects to have their own way, error results when, for any reason whatever, we mistake these effects for those of our own creation, or combine them in false relations. Again, on this metaphysical basis, we must readjust our conceptions about other persons. Do they exist at all, or are they only subjective-objects in us? The idealist implicitly says they do exist by trying to persuade them to accept his philosophical views. But how do we know they exist? Their bodies, through the manifestation of which alone we are aware of their existence, as well as our own bodies, are effects in us from the divine; and, while the

subjectivizing of their bodies annuls their objectivity for us, the subjectivizing of our own bodies does not annul us. We still directly know ourselves to be, in whom the divine mind is ever working effects, but no other mind do we directly know. We may infer an existence like our own, in as much as their bodily manifestations and ours are similar. But this is not very satisfactory, for if objective otherness is to be based on physical manifestations similar to our own, we should have to include the higher animals, and in fact, we should find ourselves drawn along down a descending scale, and would find it hard to name the point where we should leave off. This the idealist must admit or come dangerously near to solipsism again.

But if by a strong faith he asserts the objectivity of other minds as he asserted the causal objectivity of God, we have some difficulty about the relation of God to all minds. Does God work effects in such a way that the world is presented in each mind separately, or in all at the same time? That is, has each man his own world, or do we live in a common world? We cannot live in a common world, for some men are asleep while others are awake, and then the vast majority of men are now dead. From the nature of the case there is a separate working in each mind. This, moreover, we see to be the case in experience. In one mind, the effect of perfect health is worked, in another, that of pain and disease; in two

different minds the same objective effect of food is worked out, but in one case, as wholesome, and in the other case, as poisonous; in one man's world, among the effects, is that of a murderous villain, in another's innumerable painful accidents, in another's a safe and happy course of events.

Such an idealism, instead of solving difficulties, introduces them in overwhelming numbers. We cannot think Mr. Spencer altogether unjustified in an occasional sneer at the "insanities of idealism". Of course, when it is done strictly for the advantage of his "transfigured realism," we cannot avoid the suspicion that perhaps the Synthetic Philosophy is shot through here and there with a streak of insanity. And we cannot suppress the hope that a transfigured realism or a transfigured idealism may be found in which, while all difficulties may not be met, at any rate, no insanities may be found.

Now admitting that an absolute idealism, with the inconsistent addition of an objective causal Infinite mind, may be possible, on the basis of the subjectivity of our knowledge, we assert our aim to be, not a search for possibilities, but rather the less ambitious search for simple rationalities, - a humble attempt, in Plato's phrase, to see things as they really are; and so we must confess that this idealism so obstructs our path with insurmountable difficulties, and so accuses our mind, or God, with wholesale delusion that it becomes for us an impossibility if, for no other reason,

than that our ethical sense will not permit it.

We must now go back to our general conclusions and start over again on a path that we may hope will lead us to more rational results. The cosmos of nature presents itself to us as a mighty mechanism of things, reciprocally interacting according to invariable, general laws. We ourselves are in this mechanism, but not of it, in that we distinguish ourselves from it, as self-conscious, self-identical intelligences. Moreover, from our examination of the process of knowing, we learned that whatever comes into knowledge must do so by submitting itself to the interpretative, constructive power of mind; that is, all our knowledge bears a subjective character. If now looking into this world of experience, we conclude from our subjective interpretation of it that it is not objective at all, and so become absolute idealists, we find not only that our difficulties are not diminished but increased to such an extent that we feel we must be on the wrong track; and, besides, we labor under such a sense of being deceived that our ethical convictions will not permit us to attribute it either to our own mind or the universal mind. But we cannot turn to naïve realism, for our physics and physiology teach us that what the objective world gives to our sense-organs and what our sense-organs give to our percipient sense, is wholly unlike the subjective presentations which we objectify as real objects. So that, if we assert real

objects as they appear to us, their realty must rest upon our mere assertion, for, as such, they do not actually come into knowledge, and hence, may as well drop out of existence as being wholly useless. Now, if the idealist claims here that, since things prove to be not what they appear, there is deception,-the charge which we brought against his views,- we can only say the deception rests upon facts and not on mere possibilities. Furthermore, objectivity is not yet denied, and when the facts simply change the character of that objectivity, we need not feel so unfairly dealt with as when we have no objects at all for our subjective presentations.

Well then, the only course left us, in view of what we know, is to get some kind of subjective realism or objective idealism and thus, if possible, avoid the Scylla of Lockean realism, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of Fichtean idealism, on the other.

To begin with, then, we must first assert an unchanging faith in mind, as we have found that, by its activities and interpretations alone, can the problem be solved. If we do not believe in it, we must forever renounce every attempt whatsoever in the way of science or rational philosophy, for otherwise we can rely on absolutely nothing. Here scepticism says, that is just what thought brings us to; but in so saying, scepticism denies its own conclusions, by relying upon mind for a proof thereof. What a rational scepticism can say, however, is this; Investigation has often shown the naïve

impressions of popular thought to be false. But it is mind that has always done this, and mind has always readjusted itself by giving a better account of things, which readjustment resulted not in denial, but in a corrected assertion.

Turning then to mind for its unshaken testimony, we find first, an inexpugnable assertion of its unitary self-identity; secondly, a necessary assertion, in every act of knowledge, of a knowing subject and a known object; thirdly, an assertion of a priori forms or constructive principles which, while of its own nature, and hence subjective, are yet objective to it, in the sense that they are not created by the mind but discovered by it as necessary and universal modes of activity according to which it must proceed; and fourthly, the assertion of an objective world which is not in the mind nor of the mind, but discovered by the mind as coming to it, to form the content of its own subjective forms of activity. How the mind comes to all this we do not know. It simply does come to it by direct intuition. However much we may reason, the last act of knowledge and, for that matter, the first is immediate intuition, and this must be accepted as ultimate if we are to accept anything.

From these facts, it necessarily results for the objective world, that our knowledge of it must be phenomenal, that is, it is not what it appears to be, inasmuch as the inner constructive and interpretative activities have worked it over into forms of its own

subjective knowledge. But this in no way invalidates or annuls the world as objective, or shakes the mind's belief that the objective world is there. It only renders necessary a new metaphysic, and a new account of what the nature of the world really is.

Physics gives us a clue to the answer. Beginning with the popular conception that matter is dead, inert stuff, wholly passive and worked up into an infinite variety of forms by some outside power, it has come to the conviction that it is, in a sense, wholly alive and charged with invariable and limitless activity, affecting us whenever we come in contact with it.

Whatever else matter is, it is an activity working within itself and upon us; to which activity, as a conditioning cause, we respond with our interpretation of the beautiful and harmonious world of experience. What we have done, it will be observed, is not to annihilate the objective world, but to change our notions of substance from that of inert stuff or material to that of causal activity.

Here, too, will be seen the truth of what must never be forgotta viz: the basal importance of mind. Abolish the assertions of the subjective mind and you annihilate the objective world.

We have now come to a view of the relation between man and the world. It is that of reciprocal action between subject and object, and as we learned from physics that the object is activity, we may perhaps get from mind a hint of what the character of that activity must be. Since the objective action arouses mind to a subjective

reaction, there must be a community of nature underlying them. What has been said heretofore about the incomparability of of physical and psychic phenomena, does in no way affect this conclusion. It simply pointed out the dissimilarity of the two kinds of action, and, in view of the law of interaction, we saw how one action does not become the other, but is of such a character as to arouse the other. This fact is illustrated even in the reciprocal action among physical things.

Now, if things are wholly unrelated and independent, one of the other, there is no possibility of interaction. If they do interact, they must be related to one another by a fundamental community of nature. And since mind we know immediately and matter only mediately, we conclude that the objective activity of matter, in order to communicate with mind, must be of the nature of mental activity.

Mr. Spencer is wholly wrong in asserting that his formula of evolution will serve equally the materialist and the spiritualist, when he supposes that we can state the mind in terms of matter as well as matter in terms of mind. For matter must always be stated in terms of mind, whether our hypothesis of it be that of common-sense realism or absolute idealism. The only rational conception of it, then, is that it is some sort of activity of mind, not mind, but an activity of mind. We have thus far reached some general conception of the world and man, and now proceed to form some conception of God and his relations to both.

III.

We have found the world to be a vast system of uniform laws, according to which things interact. It is a harmonious whole from which we distinguish ourselves as mind, and with which we come into intelligible relations. It must be remembered that this great mechanism of nature does not present itself directly as such to us. It is an intellectual ideal that the mind constructs from its comparatively few direct experiences. On the basis of this ideal, we proceed to the study of the universe and confidently expect that further investigation will either deny or confirm our anticipatory conclusions. But we confidently and justly rest in a belief of its confirmation, for, if we had any suspicion that instead of being a cosmos of law and order, the world is a chaos of lawless disorder, our offorts after truth would come to a hopeless end. We have no proof that our ideal will be confirmed, but we have an abiding ethical conviction that it will be, and to this extent the veriest agnostic has a profound faith in God, whatever God may be.

1. Now that the mind, from its few direct experiences, has constructed this harmonious cosmos of interacting things, we ask; Does the mind demand anything further? It does. It demands a sufficient cause for the whole. The sum of the parts cannot be such a cause, for the parts are all <u>dependent</u> one on the other, and what thought demands is some <u>independent</u> ground on which they all rest. Much less can the system be considered such a cause, for the system is only a conception, and what we must have is real being. Accidence,

as a cause, is out of the question, for it is impossible to and utterly destructive of all thought. If we are to think at all, we can not rest until we have reached the First Cause, which must be Absolute, as the cause of dependent things, and Infinite, as the cause of all things; and which, as such, posits the things in existence, establishes their laws of action, and orders the whole in a mighty cosmos. Does thought demand a cause for the First Cause? No, for then that would be the First Cause and the other not. When thought reaches the Absolute and Infinite, as First Cause, it requires us to go no further, for it only demands cause for changing, dependent, finite being and not for being as such.

The scruple that the Absolute is an impossible idea, inasmuch as it must come into relations with the conditioned and thus itself, being conditioned by the relation, is no longer Absolute, is only a conceptual difficulty that must be set aside as gratuitous and inconsequential. The notion of the Absolute does not mean existence out of relation, but simply independent existence, unconditioned by its relation, and able to establish all relations. These determinations of the First Cause necessarily carry along with them the notion of unity. Not only the harmonious reciprocal inner relations of the system point to such a conclusion, the mind also demands it. If we try to conceive of a plurality of First Causes, the absoluteness of each disappears, or else they all must blend in a fundamental unity of being and purpose, in some such way as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity represents the Divine Being. But this is both

speculative and practical unity. Beneath the world then we have an Absolute and Infinite unitary First Cause, as the World-Ground. Let us remind ourselves again that this conclusion is not reached by "proof" or "demonstration," but is a demand of our cognitive interests.

2. Do those interests demand more? We reply, they certainly do, and, hence, we cannot be satisfied with these very general determinations of the World-Ground. In short, our intellectual interests demand nothing less than intelligence in the World-Ground. Looking back to the conclusion concerning the character of the natural world, as some sort of mental activity, intelligible by mind; and putting it alongside of the conclusion that the material world rests upon an Absolute and Infinite First Cause, we have nothing left to say but that the Absolute and Infinite is an intelligent causal activity. However, let us seek to approach this result more formally, by following the line of the traditional arguments. We follow two such lines, considering the subject (1) from the ideal side, and (2) from the real side. That is, starting from our own consciousness, we may follow the line of the traditional ontological argument; and then, starting from a consideration of the objective world, we may find something of worth in that other traditional "proof," called the teleological argument. Only we shall not take these arguments altogether as they were formerly used, as proofs of the existence of God, since we have already reached that doctrine, but as confirmatory reasons for the validity of our intellectual demand that God is

intelligent;; and we shall feel free to correct and modify these traditional ''proofs'' to meet our present need.

i. First,then,as to the ontological argument. Anselm made it famous by the scholastic turn he gave it,and handed it on,in that form,to be employed for centuries. From the conception of God, as the most perfect Being,he said, we conclude to his existence as one of the necessary attributes contained in the conception. This was repeated as late as Descartes and Wolff, but Kant showed it to be a piece of school wit. However, Kant overlooked the profound hidden significance lying in the scholastic form, and went so far in opposing thought to being,that both the world and God became unknowable. Hegel's reaction against this extravagant dualism,by which he identified Thought and Being,did not help the matter. Between ''The real creative thinking of God'' and our ''Ideally reproductive thinking''., Kant put an impassable barrier; Hegel removed the barrier,but also destroyed the distinction.

The real meaning of the argument is found in the mind's ability to know its objects. In order that the world may come into knowledge, that is, before objective things can be constructed into subjective presentations, there must be a fundamental community of nature underlying and uniting both. We have previously seen reasons for concluding that since matter is an activity of such a character as to affect mind which reacts upon it, it must be of the nature of mind. But the world of interacting things,as dependent and finite,rests upon the Absolute and Infinite as its cause; hence, the only con-

clusion we can draw is that that first Absolute and Infinite Cause has so constituted the reciprocal activities of the objective world as to be interpretable by mind, and is, therefore, the Intelligent Cause and the basal ground of objective and subjective activities. However much <u>above</u> intelligence God may be, he is, at least, intelligent. He cannot be less, as the cause of those objective activities upon which we subjectively react in the thought-construction of our world of experience. This is the core of the ontological argument. Because, as intelligences we can think the world, the world in some sense must be the thought of its Infinite Cause; and hence, God must be intelligent. We may illustrate by our common experience of reading written signs. In their objectivity they are quite different from the meaning we get out of them; but they originated in an intelligence like our own and were written down for us to read back the meaning which was originally put into them.

This illustration may also be used with a bearing upon our notions of truth and error. If the interpreting intelligence reads out of the characters all the originating intelligence put into them, he has the entire truth; if he falls short of the entire meaning, he has only partial truth, with a possibility of gaining more; if he wholly or in part mistakes the meaning, he, in so far, falls into error, with the possibility of correcting his mistakes; if, becoming disheartened, he denies all meaning, he is a full fledged skeptic, with no health or salvation in him; except as he takes heart and goes at his reading again. Now precisely do we have this task of reading

nature on a grand scale, in all our scientific investigations. The cosmos is a sort of colossal manuscript, covered over with the messages of the Infinite mind. Our business as intelligences is to decipher its meaning. It is more than the task of a lifetime or of a generation. We have scarcely, thus far, made more out of it, all of us together, than a firm belief that it is, at any rate, readable; and we do see in it, we are convinced, some evidences of order, plan, harmony, adaptation, and a sort of intelligent design. Of all the queer readings up to date, none is so empty and insane as a petulant denial of any meaning in the manuscript at all. This is recreancy to our own intelligence; and, although it bravely denies intelligence in the writing and in the author, by no means does it, as some think, annul them. Perhaps there is a whimsy still more insane, and that is the attempt to read the scroll as intelligible and yet to deny intelligence in its author. If the author of the writing is not intelligent, then the writing is not intelligible and, if with what we call our intelligent minds, we are making it out at all, we must rename the intelligence of our minds, as the process we are going through is not an intelligent one. Perhaps then we might more appropriately designate the mind as a bit of mush. If the Absolute and Infinite Cause of the cosmos is not an Intelligence, then our whole structure of knowledge tumbles into irredeemable and inextricable chaos. The patient and humble reading of the divine writing is the business of science and philosophy. Nay more, to anticipate, it is the business of art, of ethics, and

of religion. To give any incentive and hope of success to science, the intellect demands that the Divine Cause shall be intelligent; and to give any worth or meaning to art, morality, and religion, the aesthetic, moral, and religious nature demands that, in God, as the source of all being, shall dwell the fulness of beauty and goodness. This is the core of the ontological argument, viz: that the truth of man's thinking within corresponds to the truth of God's thought without, and is expressed in the Psalmist's beautiful words: "In Thy light we see life."

ii. Having considered, in the ontological argument, the intelligence of the First Cause from the subjective side, the side of our own consciousness, we turn now to view it from the objective side, to a consideration of the natural order itself. How will such a consideration lead us to intelligence in God? We take up the teleological argument, although, as before said, not in its traditional form. It might seem that the correspondence between thought and thing, based as it is, as it must be, on a community which can alone be found in the mind of the Infinite, would render the design argument unnecessary as pointing to intelligence in the World-Ground. But the argument is so venerable, so cogent with unsophisticated understanding, and, withal, so highly esteemed by the learned, that a sort of poetic justice demands a notice of it here. Out of the vast amount of material for and against, a few things may be said to clear away misapplications and to set forth the central meaning of the argument. While we start here from an objective view, we

are brought back, as we always are, to the mind for its interpretation. We ourselves are conscious of freely forming plans in thought and then of volitionally carrying them out by use of the various means at our command. We design and accomplish; and , as nature seems to be designed, as means seem to be adapted to ends in realizing purposes, we argue to an intelligent purposive act of the Infinite Will, as the final cause of the whole. This is the essence of the argument. Its application to the actual facts and the inferences therefrom may be erroneous. Nature is designed it is said; design means an intelligent designer; therefore, nature springs from intelligence. But that nature is designed or reveals design is disputed, and further, it is claimed that, even if there appears to be design in nature, it may spring from some other cause than intelligence. Kant, although he called this argument the oldest, the clearest, and the best adapted to the common reason, and adds that it must always be mentioned with respect, passes upon it some serious criticisms, But aside from the objections that in inorganic nature we see usableness merely, rather than design; and that in organic nature no unlimited purposeiveness is evident, but much, on the other hand, that is contrary to design in detail, from which we are not justified in concluding to a perfect designing intelligence; Kant's whole criticism lies against the current anthropomorphism and Deistical doctrine of the relation of God to the world, and not against the proper essence of the argument. Now if we look more closely at his objections, they may prove not so valid as they appear, and then,

if we substitute our present cosmical view for the old Deistical one, the force of his criticism will be largely annulled.

It is true that inorganic nature seems to reveal only helpless necessity, under the control of general laws that might have any number of other results. But the very fact of a great system of controlling laws which may work this way and that in an infinite number of applications, while they themselves maintain rigorously their validity, instead of suggesting no design, rather suggests design on the grandest scale. Could these laws act in only one way upon any given material, or did they change their direction and order capriciously, we could see no reason or purpose in them whatever. But the opposite is the case. Changeless forces, acting in uniform and invariable ways, capable of an infinite variety of applications, yet producing one result in the inorganic world, is a marvel of self centered intelligence, and even suggests the integrity of ethical character. This, of course, is said with the understanding that the fallacy of the universe is strictly banished. A system of laws and forces as such is merely nothing. It rises into reality when laws and forces are the methods and actions of real Being.

Turning to the inorganic world, as a result, under the reign of law, Kant's objection is that no intelligent design is observable in the adaptation of parts. To a great extent this must be admitted, so far as we can now see, but it cannot be admitted wholly. To take one illustration. The atmospheric envelop surrounding our world seems to be adapted with the nicety and discrimination of intelligence

itself for the uses of the underlying earth, and its vegetal and animal life. Under the heat of the sun, it becomes an absorbent of moisture which it lifts from the ocean and carries over the land. So finely is it adjusted for its purpose that, instead of merly covering the earth with a dense fog, it lifts the cloudshigh over the earth and then [illegible], instead of pouring its contents down in destructive torrents,- a fact which in millions of times does indeed occur once,- it uniformly distributes its fertilizing wealth over vast surfaces. Moreover, the air not only distributes moisture over the earth, it also distributes light and heat. What the world would be for vegetal and animal life without this triple atmospheric function cannot be imagined. To this the opposer of final Cause triumphantly exclaims: Organic life would have been wholly different or not at all. The whole point of the objection to design is just this: If things had been different they would not be as they are. A doctrine the profundity and universality of which at once commends itself to the profoundest agnostic and the shallowest numbskull. There must be great truth in it, for we cannot too much discredit the convictions of universal consciousness. But this truism of atheistic reasoning is also just the point of the design argument. Were the functions of the atmosphere different, why then, as if a sort of intelligent being like ourselves, organic nature ~~like ourselves, organic nature~~ would adapt itself to the difference. If the inorganic world is neither adapted, nor adapts itself, to the organic world, then as the next best thing the organic, by a fine

instinct, adapts itself to the inorganic; and the wonder about it is that the inorganic is of such a nature that it makes this adaptation possible. It makes no difference to us from which side we start, the fine and sympathetic adjustment occurs. In fact, our present scientific views, especially those based on the theory of development, which by one of those mysterious perversities of fate, has been used to rob the universe of intelligence, but which, in reality, is only possible on the basis of intelligence, teach us with univocal force that organic and inorganic are exactly adjusted, each to the other. If a flower is planted in a new environment, the only thing for it is not to die, but it looks about for what it can use and finally comes to an adjusted relation with its new surroundings. As we see this almost intelligent activity, we can say with Lowell, "Every clod...climbs to a soul in grass and flowers". If the rudimentary aquatic animal, by some mighty revolution is thrown upon the land, it does not become a pessimist, at war with fate, but stretches its gills to lungs and its fins to wings and thus adjusts itself to the requirements of a larger and higher life. In view of this universal adaptation among reciprocally acting elements, we must, unless we wish to plunge again into the cavernous depths of the fallacy of the universal, base it all, as we have before seen, upon the Infinite Unitary Being, who posits and directs the whole and all its parts in the harmony of the cosmos.

When we turn with Kant to organic nature, we do find unmistakeable and numerous indications of adaptation. From the lowest algae

to the most highly organized animals there is some appearance of final cause, in an infinite variety of forms. His objection that here, however, there is much that is contrary to design and detail, we will admit, so far as we can now see. Much inorganic nature seems to be only contrivance more or less skilfull, and, instead of having intelligent design, seems , on the other hand, to oppose design. A dozen or more parasites whose only function seems to be to destroy, use their entire and sole energy in tearing down the brain, the lungs, and all the vital organs of man, as if their only aim was to defeat the purpose of the creator in his highest work. Such facts give us pause, and may lead us to doubt any purposive aim in the world at all. But this, after all, does not abolish the innumerable instances of adaptation. Indeed, the microbes, in a way, adapt themselves to their functions; and we may say in general throughout the whole vast realm of nature, as we behold it, adaptation of means to ends there surely is; but we must humbly confess our ignorance of the total plan of things; and, avoiding premature conclusions, which are always an offence to sane thought, we must be content to wait until a more complete investigation and a wider knowledge brings what now seems contradictory, perhaps because simply misunderstood, into harmony with the whole grand system. We do see with considerable clearness, in all our science, - and work upon the conviction of intelligible plan with great confidence, - a mighty organism of nature, mutually adaptive in all its parts. Now to oppose to this as annulling it, those negative conclusions in which we see simply <u>no</u> intelligent

purpose, would be the height of speculative folly. A mere theoretical view of the whole may not lead us to a satisfactory view of the purposive plan of the Infinite, but we are not shut up to theoretical inquiries and conclusions alone. Perhaps, by an ethical interpretation of things, we shall reach conclusions which, while they do not clear away all difficulties, at any rate, chasten our spirits into a determined purpose of patient inquiry and humble waiting.

However, there is more to be said on theoretical ground, suggested by Kant's position. The force of his criticism, it was remarked, lay in the prevalent Deistical view of the relation of God to the world. Such a view can no longer be held, in religious or irreligious thinking. God is no longer outside the world, an absentee God, having created it and flung it off his finger, and then , perhaps, interfering occasionally in its mechanism. But God, whatever he may be conceived to be, is ever present in the world, everywhere working in all its parts. So that whether there be or be not intelligent design in nature, it all belongs to the perpetual working of the Infinite. Nature is an all inclusive harmonious organism, with no part of it unrelated to the rest, nor unrelated to God. So that, if we find design and adaptation anywhere therein, it must belong to the absolute World-Ground that elsewhere works without plan or purpose, But if plan and purpose reveal themselves to us at all, our conclusion should be that where we see them not, is a matter of our seeing, and not a matter of being. As to the plan on which the World-Ground proceeds, the common modern conviction furnishes us with a concep-

tion in the doctrine of development which means nothing less than an intelligent purposive working toward ends, on an inconceivably grand scale. A doctrine which, it has been remarked, is often used, by the most singularly irrational perversion, to deny all intelligent purpose. The kernel of the development doctrine is this: Things proceed from a simple inchoate condition by reciprocal action according to general laws, until the solar system has reached its present diverse development, and the earth is fitted for the appearance of life. Here geology leaves off, and biology, taking up the continuous line, traces the evolution of life, from a simple germ, by an uninterrupted, connected process, until the goal is reached in man. Biology has now completed its function, and history takes up the line as it marks the rise of mind and all its varied activities, as they are developed into a vast social structure, in the inner reciprocal relations of which, art, literature, science, philosophy, ethics, and religion grow to more and more. But the end is not yet. Those, especially, who pervert the doctrine are most enthusiastic in their hopeful prophecies that society and man are going on to a blessedness and fulness of life which rivals the most luminous visions of the sacred Prophets.

Now what does this widely accepted doctrine, not only imply but assert, by the mere statement of it? It asserts an inconceivably grand outcome, toward which, with steady and changeless intent, the whole creation groans. It is a sort of detailed exposition of Paul's hope. In presence of this mighty purposive ongoing, Paley's poor little argument about the watch or Janets' chick in its egg, sinks

into insignificance. All the same, what Paley and Janet have said, at bottom, remains forever true. When we see any contrivance the working of which in whole or in part is intelligible to us, we properly attribute it to intelligent design, after the manner in which we know intelligent design in ourselves. For, since we alone know intelligent design in ourselves as the cause of contrivance, our only rational recourse is to explain contrivance not our own by such a cause. When it is objected that because things move on as if they were designed, there is no proof of design, we can but share the weary feeling of the old Latin poet who, on a famous occasion, exclaimed: O tempora O mores! On the basis of such an objection, we must deny intelligent purpose to the activities of all of our fellow men,- a thing which indeed is often not hard to do. We never see the intelligent purpose behind any of the realized activities of our fellowmen. The result looks as if it were designed, from what we know of our own inner purposes and outer realizations. If we were to carry out this objection in earnest, we should be compelled to say that the only intelligent purposive activity is to be found in ourselves. There is none in the cosmos, and there is absolutely less than nothing of it in other men.

Those who pervert the doctrine of development to the denial of purposive intelligence in the world, fall into two chief errors: the deification of necessity; and the confusion of design with cause.

(1) This whole grand scheme they say is a necessary outcome of preceding conditions. To make the claim plausible they start back-

ward after unity. This they at last find, not in the universal and empty abstraction of Being as the Hindu does, but in an abstract simple elemental stuff which they erroneously consider real. They reach it by dropping out gradually, on their way back, the distinctions and diversities of the present complete whole, and come at last to the atom in which they triumphantly find "the promise and potency of all forms of existence". They are now ready to return to the world of reality; and, as they do so, each element dropped on the backward way is surreptitiously dragged into the evolving atom, until they arrive once more at the place whence they started with the whole world with them. It is a sort of scientific John Gilpin's ride.

It is apparent, at once, that either everything in the world now is in the atom when found, or else there are constant additions to it all along the process of development. But in the former case we are told nothing that throws light on design, we are simply told <u>how</u> the plan worked out. The world is all in the atom, the atom has become the world, and wherever we begin or stop we shall find the whole content there, realized or potential. What we are now seeking is not <u>how</u> the plan works out, but how the plan came to be. If we take the latter alternative, we deny the doctrine of efficient cause, and assert that from nothing something comes. Hence, those who seek to explain the marvellous plan of development, as a plan at all, on the basis of necessity, are guilty of a tremendous inconsequence. They utterly miss the mark because they do not even see it.

(2) The confusion of design with cause is quite perennial. It may be illustrated by supposing a man, on finding a watch, to conclude at first to design on the part of the maker. But, on further inquiry, he finds that the watch has been made by a machine. He still believes the machine is the result of intelligent purpose in the inventor. But still further investigation shows him that the machine was made by a larger machine, and so on indefinitely. He finally concludes that, after all, the design of marking time in the watch was not intended by some intelligent workman, but that it resulted as an outcome of the efficient causal working of the backward series of machines. That is, to his mind, design has been swallowed up in efficient cause. But for the realization of any plan, in which, as a mere plan, there is no effectuating power, we need causal means in order to reach the end. Design necessitates means, means come to nothing without design. So we may put in the whole infinite chain of continuous efficient causes, in the scheme of development, but that in no sense explains the outcome. The outcome results from an ordered use of the means. Let the machine of Nature turn out an infinite variety of things, from grains of sand to the human form, and the question remains: How did it come to pass that the parts of the machine were so related to each other as to turn out these results? The efficient causes worked together to an end, but their efficiency to work to that end in no way informs us why they should move toward that end. Hence, development reveals a great design in the infinite World-Ground which is being effectu-

ated through the causal means of the natural mechanism. All along the wonder grows to the conception of a greater and higher design than we at first conceived, and we do not yet know what that marvelous plan means; but, in presence of its irresistible ongoings which deepen in harmonious unity and broaden in wondrous design, we can possess our souls in reverent awe, as the changeless power of the Eternal moves on, unhindered, to the realization of his vast designs. With the Psalmist, we may well say: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, it is high, I cannot attain unto it." But we must also, at any rate, say with the Apostle: "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." Our general conclusion, then, from these considerations is, that the Infinite and Absolute First Cause is an intelligence, not because of "proof" or "demonstration", in the strict sense of the word, but because (1) viewing the question from the subjective side, our conviction that the world is intelligible, and the fact that whatever its meaning, it must be fitted for the interpretative forms and activities of thought, necessarily imply its origination in an intelligence like to our own; and because (2) viewing the question from the objective side, the world-order reveals purposive plans, which indeed are above our comprehension, but the grand adaptive order, mutual harmony, and expanding development of which, mean nothing to us unless they mean the realization of intelligent design.

3. We have now to ask ourselves: Does this yet exhaust our

interests in the problem as rational beings ? Evidently not. For as we have before observed, the intellectual requirements do not constitute the total demands of life, nor do they form its major part. More imperative than all else is the unconditioned commands of conscience. Were our whole problem confined within the realm of the so-called natural sciences, we might trace out the laws of phenomena, note their order and harmony, and, concluding to a cosmic intelligence, bow before it as the changeless ground of the universe; but when history begins in the first pair of human beings, there, at once, arises the problem of their mutual relations. Our practical activities are, at once, restricted and conditioned so soon as another being like ourselves comes into the range of our experiences. There sweeps into our ken a new world, the world of human society, and our rational considerations must now take on an ethical character. We are no longer in a world where we are simply to come into right relations of thought, but also in a world where we are to come into right relations of action; we have added to our theoretical world the practical world; to truth, duty; to the laws of intellect, the laws of conscience. We now not only ask what is, but also what ought to be? and, whereas, heretofore, we have passively accepted relations in thought which were discovered to be present in the outer world, we now have actively to realize, in the future, relations in the outer world, by an act of the will, under the demands of the imperative Ought. Does this demand, which springs out of the moral nature of man, and developed in the relations of human society, lead us to any further determinations concerning the nature of the World-Ground?

Having found that, in order to maintain the integrity and secure the worth of our own intelligent nature, we must posit intelligence in the Absolute and Infinite First Cause; must we also, in order to maintain the sanity and worth of our moral nature, attribute to that same First Cause an ethical character? The same speculative considerations that apply to the one case, apply also to the other, and we are left no alternative but to answer in the affirmative. Such an answer mankind has always given, in basing personal duties and the obligations of society, as a whole, upon the Divine nature.

As in getting a speculative view of the universe, we found ourselves obliged to employ throughout the subjective terms of mind, and yet had to recognize, first, the universal a priori forms of thought as objective to us, in the sense of being common to all and beyond our individual power of production or modification; and, secondly, the world of objects which make up the content of our thinking; and hence, were under the necessity of forming the ideal of an objectively intelligible world, meeting the requirements of our theoretical reason, and then, as both are dependent, finite, and caused, of finding their grounds in the intelligent, purposive activity of the Absolute and Infinite First Cause: In like manner, in order to get an ethical view of the universe, we are obliged to employ the subjective terms of the moral consciousness, and yet have to recognize, first, the universal, a priori forms of the ethical judgment, as objective to us, in the sense of being common to all and beyond our individual power of production or modification; and, secondly, the world of

objective, concrete duties arising in the mutual, conditioned interaction between ourselves and other men, which makesup the content of our moral life; and hence, are under the necessity of forming the ideal of an objectively moral world, meeting the requirements of our practical reason, and then, as both are dependent, finite, and caused, of finding their common ground in the moral purposive activity of the Absolute and Infinite First Cause. This, in a wórd, is the moral or practical argument for the belief that the World-Ground is ethical. It derives its force from the ethical nature of the mind which must construct a moral ideal in order to the understanding, preservation, and satisfaction of its own moral character. The reality of this ideal, as living being behind the universe, is not proved, and it presents difficulties by no means trivial to thought; but, on any other basis, the ethical nature of man is an adventitious, mysterious fact, and any practical code of morality is an impertinent inconsequence. If the wisdom of God is to stand as a necessity of the cognitive faculty, the goodness of God stands as a necessity of the moral faculty, with this in favor of the latter: Much of our confidence in the permanence and trustworthiness of the intelligible world-order grows out of a conscious or unconscious ethical conviction that we can securely rest on the constant integrity of its phenomena and their relations; and, moreover, while our cognitions may be satisfied with a view of the objective world, other than man, our consciences have just this reference to the development of the human race, throughout history, in all

its practical relations. Thought then makes a greater demand for the identification of its ethical ideal with the First Cause than for an intelligent World-Ground. If we deny the latter, we cannot think ; if we deny the former, we have no justification in trying to think.

Furthermore, the ethical argument begins to throw some light on what seems to the mind to be design in the natural order. From the side of a cognitive view, a grand scheme of marvellous adaptation and harmonious order working to an end, is the most that can be seen. According to some great uniform plan, worlds develop and decay, plants develop and decay, animals, including man, develop and decay; an unchanging cycle of genesis, growth, death. In addition to this cycle we see a progression also. The inorganic world rises to the organic in vegetal life, the vegetal reaches up to the animal life, and the animal rises to rational mind in man, revealing , in the varied social life of historic developments, the rich products of scientific and philosophical thought, the numberless creations of art and literature, and the deep and ineradicable convictions of morality and religion. What is to be the outcome of this vast movement in time? The cognitive view can give no answer; it indeed needs none. But, in the light of ethical requirements, and only in such light, can a clear and satisfying answer be given. The final cause, as the triumphant purpose of Holy Will, lies ever in the living Goodness of the First Cause who posits, directs and controls, in consonance with the changeless integrity of his character, the whole cosmos of things and their relations in the natural world-order, to the complete sat-

isfaction not only of his Wisdom, but also of his Love. That we must come to some such conclusion, in consideration of our moral nature and its development in experience, and unless it is to fall into remediless chaos, can only be disputed on the basis of an empirical moral consciousness. But empiricism is as untenable in ethics as it is in cognition. It is admitted that our moral consciousness develops in reciprocal action with society, thus receiving its definite content, its knowledge of specific duties in detail.

But that which lies under all distinctions of right and wrong, whereby there is raised in us an unconditioned claim to obedience, quite apart from external consequences, we could never have learned from the instruction of society, unless there was a "moral sense;" a norm of moral judgment which is before social experience, and quite authoratative over us. This "Conscience" as we call it, is not a sum of innate ideas, for then we could not explain the varied multiplicity of men's moral opinions. As little can we consider it a mere empirical copy of the practices and opinions of society prevalent at any time, for this would not account for the fact of its independent, obligatory, and judicial authority.

Especially would be unaccountable the facts of historic moral development, in which there is often seen a direct opposition of the ethical judgment, to the moral standards of the community, particularly in the case of those reformers and heroes of moral progress who, for the sake of the higher ideal right, deny and combat the actual right as it is commonly understood by society.

In view of these facts, we can only conclude that, in the unity of the developed conscience, there are two factors, an innate or a priori factor, which furnishes the active norms of moral judgment, and an aposteriori, or empirical factor, which supplies the content of the developed moral life. On the former, rests the changeless, self-identical, and formal character of conscience, on the latter, rest the manifold variety and changeability of its particular activities. We must again remind ourselves that this a priori factor, constituting the norms of moral judgment, is objective to us, in the sense that it is universal, and while constituting the law of our inner nature, is yet given to us, and in no way created or modified by our efforts. Our freedom does not give to us this law in any way, as Kant taught, but presupposes it. Our freedom does not produce the unconditionedness of the moral judgment, but realizes its function in bringing all the specific activities of life into harmony with its details.

Moreover, our practical experiences, which give the moral judgment its content, also reveal to the moral consciousness an ethical order, as an ideal to be realized. This ethical ideal, which manifests itself to us through our reciprocal objective experiences with the moral world-order, is a supreme factor in our moral development, and depends for its value upon our conception of God, man, the world, and their mutual relations. Here then we have a third factor that enters organically into the moral life of man; and, as experience increases and the conscience refines, there will be borne in upon the enriching and deepening moral nature a higher and nobler ideal life.

We see here again the parallel between the development of the cognitive and the ethical natures. As knowledge is made possible by reason of subjective a priori forms of thought, which are brought into regulative and constructive activity upon the materials of objective experience, and as out of this union of the inner and outer worlds in experience, there reveals itself an objective ideal, intelligible order, which it is the business of thought to confirm; so, in like manner, ethics is made possible by reason of the subjective a priori norms of judgment which are brought into regulative and constructive activity upon the materials of objective experience, and out of this union of the inner and outer worlds in experience, there reveals itself an objective ideal moral order which it is the business of the will to realize. And as that objective intelligible order, together with the interpreting mind, was alone explicable on the assumption of a First Cause, who, as author of the intelligible order, is supreme Wisdom in which all intelligence centres; so also the moral order, together with the realizing will, is alone explicable on the assumption of a First Cause who, as author of the moral order, is supreme Love, in which all goodness centres.

But this great temporal distinction, we must observe, exists between them. While the ideal intelligible order is not yet fully confirmed by our knowledge, it nevertheless becomes immediately present when thought does apprehend it; for it is the passive nature of cognition to accept the moment of insight. On the other hand, the ideal moral order is always future, not only must it be apprehended by the moral

consciousness, it must also be realized by an act of the will. So that what is, is recognized as not what ought to be; and this applies not only to the individual moral life, but to that of the community as well.

It may be remarked here that the failure in ethical discussions to recognize the three factors of the moral life (1) the inner norms of judgment, (2) the concrete practical rules or code of action, and (3) the ideal to be realized, has occasioned much confusion and misunderstanding of the problem. The failure also to recognize the peculiar nature of the "ought to be" as distinguished from the "what is", in virtue of which the present as evil must ever give way to the future as good, has been the cause of infinite logomachies between optimist and pessimist. So far as the conflict between optimist and pessimist is concerned, the great doctrine of development ought to mitigate somewhat the warfare; even if the opponents will not listen to Paul's "Leaving the things which are behind and pressing forward to the things which are before", or John's "It doth not yet appear what we shall be", or Christ's "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect"; even if they will forget the instinctive, universal, and unquenchable faith in something better than now is, and that right must ever remain right and prove itself to be triumphant over reality, while wrong must be confounded. In the face of the greatest doctrine of science, in contradiction to the quite universal moral convictions of man, and in the face of the greatest ethical authorities,

the optimist complacently proclaims, Whatever is is best, forgetting that under the command of the moral ideal, "What is" becomes evil in the light of "what ought to be", both in the individual man and in society. While the pessimist, usually deranged as to his digestive organs, has not even the merit of flattering our self-righteousness. To use a parable. He is like a man at a fish dinner who, instead of eating the sweet morsel apportioned to him, with a good conscience and in the fear of God, crabbedly insists on picking out the bones and, either thrusting them under our noses or swallowing them, thus disturbs the whole table, or aggravates his already atrabilious digestion. If we would maintain our moral sanity, we should do well to steer between the academic optimist and the somewhat battered pessimist. The one is superficial, blandly minifying or overlooking the damnableness of real sin and evil in the world; the other minifying or overlooking the power and prevalence of real goodness and happiness in the world. Neither of them interprets aright the meaning of the "Ought to be"; the one saying it "is", the other that it "cannot be". Both are practical necessitarians, and here morality disappears.

Before leaving this subject, something may be said on the ethical character of the natural and the historical world-orders.

(1) It is often said that the order of nature is ethically indifferent, or non-moral. This expression, however, cannot go unchallenged. To correct all hasty conclusions, it must first be recognized that we do not understand the whole plan and meaning of nature.

With the ethical idea in God, and an order of unfolding development in time, we cannot pronounce on the goodness or badness of the actual present world until the limits of the development is reached in the realization of the ideal. But from what we know, it is often said we do see nature red in tooth and claw; we do cower before its destructive earthquakes, hurricanes, and pestilences; and we never find it responding to our prayers and agonizing entreaties. Positively it destroys, negatively it is indifferent. Such a view, however, must be attributed to the hasty petulance of childish empty-headedness, when a more comprehensive view of the matter is taken. The destructive forces of nature compared with her constructive forces, are as one to infinity. Destructive storms and earthquakes and the like are so infrequent that their occurrence causes a general exaggeration of them. Pestilence and disease are not the rule; and if we were to eliminate man's ignorance and sinfulness, they would in all probability disappear.

So far as the cruelty in animal life is concerned, we are apt to exaggerate it. What pain animals suffer we do not know, but whatever it is, it seems to be swift and sudden. Death comes to them in the ecstacy of conflict, or with a sudden leap of some powerful enemy. It is soon over, and we might compare this sudden taking-off favorably with the slow decline and long continued pain so often found connected with the death of man. On the other hand, the exquisite pleasure of every fish and bird and beast throughout nature, in the instinctive exercise of its living powers, is quite evident to the most careless observer.

But as little as we are able to speak of the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom, we have direct knowledge of them in our own experiences. When we have allowed for all the pain men suffer in the course of nature, we yet have such a superabundance of delight and enjoyment that we may well follow the fine instinct of the old Greeks in calling the earth our nourishing mother. Mother Earth first bears us, then feeds us abundantly, and supplies us with materials for raiment and shelter. She frowns upon us at times, but her frowns are terrible to us because her face is so constantly benignant. Instead of calling nature malevolent or indifferent we should rather say that she is always concerning herself with our welfare and is lavishly benevolent. So much is this so that Jesus likened the abundant sunshine and rain to the all-embracing and loving care of God.

And if we arouse ourselves from mere physical comfortableness and pleasure, to the exercise of our artistic and ethical perceptions, we shall find in nature a wealth of enjoyment and instruction that is incalculable. The poet may here become our teacher

"Not only around our infancy
Doth heaven with all its splendors lie;
Daily, with souls that cringe and plot,
We Sinais climb and know it not.

Over our manhood bend the skies;
Against our fallen and traitor lives
The great winds utter prophecies;

With our faint hearts the mountain strives;
Its arms outstretched, the druid wood
Waits with its benedicite;
And to our ages' drowsy blood
Still shouts the inspiring sea.

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At the devil's booth all things are sold,
Each ounce of dross costs its ounce of gold;
For a cap and bells our lives we pay,
Bubbles we buy with a whole soul's tasking;
'Tis heaven alone that is given away,
'Tis only God may be had for the asking;
No price is set on the lavish summer
June may be had by the poorest comer.

And what is so rare as a day in June?
Then, if ever, come perfect days;
Then Heaven tries the Earth if it be in tune,
And over it softly her warm ear lays;
Whether we look or whether we listen,
We hear life murmer or see if glisten;
Every clod feels the stir of might,
An instinct within it that reaches and towers,
And, groping blindly above it for light,
Climbs to a soul in grass and flowers."

"The Vision of Sir Launfal" Lowell

Who has not recognized in Wordsworth's "Lines written above Tintern Abbey" a new revelation and a new source of moral inspiration? And we are all familiar with Ruskin's somewhat ill-natured railings at our stupidity and blindness for trying to amuse ourselves with our own ugly trifles when the clouds, by night and by day, are painting upon the canvas of the sky pictures of ever varying beauty and sublimity for our delight and edification.

Again, if we purge our ethical vision, we read in nature the most salutary moral lessons. Those who eat and drink unworthily at her sacramental table, do indeed eat and drink damnation to their own souls. The lecher, the sot, the glutton, instead of taking with clean hands and a pure heart the divinely offered food, have sacreligiously seized and thanklessly and greedily devoured more than their portion, and, though measurelessly merciful, nature at last visits them with justly merited punishment.

Consider, if we will, the ethical import of her changless ways. Like God, her days are ever of old, and she changes not. She invariably maintains that consistency, which may be "the bugbear of weak minds," but is the corner stone of the righteous integrity of the Eternal, who, in his providential care "neither slumbers nor sleeps," "the same yesterday, today, and forever more," with "faithfulness the girdle of his reins". The obedient heavens and the submissive earth, ever hearkening to the word of God, present to us the sublimest lessons of changless moral integrity, and therefore of that true freedom which is harmony with the Divine Will. Whether we make

nature all, or only the expression of the living God, this lesson comes to us the same.

Lastly, we see that like the Eternal, nature is no respecter of persons. While she ''gives us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness'', she will not stoop to our mean ways and hear our foolish cries ; but with calm and persistent wisdom chastises us in justice and mercy, ever bidding us thereby to learn her higher ways and, rising obediently thereto, to walk in the blessedness of life. For, like the Divine Wisdom, ''Her ways are pleasantness and all her paths are peace''. She seems ever to say ''Blessed is the man that heareth me, watching daily at my gates, waiting at the posts of my doors. For whoso findeth me, findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Eternal. But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul; all they that hate me love death'' (Prov. viii. 34-36).

What an incalculable misfortune it would be if every capricious desire could have its way with nature, instead of the present invariable order by which her command brings every desire into harmony therewith. In the light of what has been said, we see that rather than nature's being non-moral and indifferent, it is we who are immoral and selfishly biassed. The nearer we bring ourselves to the moral ideal, the clearer we see that nature is our beneficent friend and mighty helper. The face that looked so terrible and threatening in the past got its expression from our own ignorance and sinfulness,

and as we have learned more and become better, that face has begun to beam with grace and beneficence.

It certainly can be no mere coincidence that, as the spirit of war ceases among men and international amity and individual sympathy and tolerance grow apace, nature should more fully reveal to us her mighty hidden powers for our use and happiness. In an age of general tribal warfare and religious intolerance, our present knowledge of chemistry and electricity would have been used to blow up the whole creation. We are still degraded enough but, as a wise administrator, nature seems to bestow upon us her secrets of power as we become more and more ethically worthy to be entrusted therewith. There is profound significance in the words of the wise old Eliphaz who, describing the perfectly righteous man says: "Thou shalt be in league with the stones of the field; and the beasts of the field shall be at peace with thee." (Job v. 23.) And the far off vision of the Elder Isaiah is not without its meaning, in the light of what we know of the relation of the moral life to nature, when he pictures the harsh cruel forces of nature coming to peace with the mild and harmless ones. "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them." (Is. xi. 6.)

In conclusion, it must be remembered that the contention here is not that by an independent study of nature, it clearly shows itself ethical, but that as it can only be intelligible in the light of man's inner intelligence, so we cannot pronounce upon its moral or

non-moral character, until we see whether man's ethical nature, considered in the full extent of its ideal, does not come into harmonious relations with it. And we maintain that it becomes more and more evident that, as man is moralized, nature shows herself more and more as a harmonious co-working power toward total moral perfection.

(2) We now have to ask, Does the ethical ideal derive any support from the historical real? In spite of pause and retrogression, we must affirm that history moves toward a higher moral plane of better government, better laws, better codes of life. One illustration will serve. At first, war was a mere brutal exhileration, resulting in extermination. Then it took a step forward. Though still bloody and terrible, it was waged to win slaves; life was spared, but prisoners were subjected to unrequited toil. Then it took on a larger meaning. It was carried on for dominion and power, for commerce and wealth. At last, it rose to a struggle for liberty, and, as crude as our civilization still is, with a Christianity only skin-deep, it is practically impossible for nations to go to war except on the basis of some great principle of justice. In modern times from the days of Grotius's Mare Clausum, international law has been refining toward higher and better moral standards. The whole course of this change, is concretely presented to any student of English history. From the time when the savage Angles and Saxons came to Britain, ruthlessly destroying men, women and children, to the present day, the progress in national morality has been incalculable. To the gentle teachings of Christ, which St. Augustine

brought to them, those rude men and their descendants were susceptible. Extermination gave place to slavery, slavery to serfdom, serfdom to manumission, and this nominal freedom to the real freedom of English liberty. And while we must confess that our English cousins, together with the rest of the world, are not all they might be, remembering the hole whence they were digged, we may thank God they are what they are; and in justice to them, with all their faults, we must not forget the great beneficent activities and influences of the English people, the world over.

To mark individual progress we may count the years, to mark that of a nation we must be patient to wait the slow rolling centuries. And with this concrete fact of progress, we must hold to an unchanging faith in the future. But if ever the New Zealander does sit on the ruins of London Bridge to contemplate the decay of past greatness, our belief will remain firm that that ruin and decay is a consequence of turning back from the moral ideal.

We have thus abundant reasons, on considering the objective world-orders of nature and history, and the nature of the knowing and willing mind, to attribute to the world-ground Wisdom and Love. Wisdom as expressing the totality of all metaphysical attributes, and Love as including all ethical determinations. This conclusion we must again say is not "proved" speculatively, but based, as it is, on numberless theoretical confirmations and fundamental assumptions made necessary in order to preserve the mind from annihilation, it amounts to an ethical conviction, which difficulties cannot shake, and

which has its primal foundation in this fact, that without it thought is an impossibility and morality has no meaning.

4. Before considering the relation of God, the Absolute and Infinite First Cause, to the world and man, we pause to consider a necessary inference about which there has been much confusion,-the inference, viz: that God, being intelligent and Good, is personal. The most vulgar misunderstanding on this point is that of supposing that personality refers to some specific form of corporeality. God is pictured as a venerable patriarch with long white beard and purple robe, sitting on a golden throne. And then when our views change from a belief in deistic absenteeism to a theistic immanence, we give up his personality as if its essence were represented by that crude picture. But a moments consideration will show that our own personality and that of others does not ~~find~~ have its meaning in bodily form, There are heights and depths in all personalities, in no way represented in the body. We never estimate friendship or a man's ethical or intellectual worth by his portrait. That personality which has most profoundly affected human history, and still affects mankind, is not known in its bodily form, though the personality itself is more potent and influential than it was eighteen centuries ago. Paul, that great moral and religious genius, who spirtitualized and universalized Jewish Christianity, thanked God that he knew not Christ after the flesh. And yet, upon his life, the personality of Christ exerted an omnipotent control, and through him, a growing influence upon civilization.

If then we ask, just what personality is, the only answer we can find is that contained in our own consciousness. There we find personality to consist of real unitary being that knows, feels, and acts; it is the self-conscious, self-identical ego that freely chooses to act for reasons, the value of which, he finds within his own sensibilities. This ego manifests itself in many ways, but is not limited by corporeal form. Limited and finite as we are, our most characteristic activites, sofar as we can see, do not draw their meaning from the physical manifestation. Yet personality must take some form or it vanishes into mist. It were wiser for us, perhaps, to let the form of God be what it may, without trying to picture it, content that his personality, as such, in no way depends upon it. But it must be said, in order to correct a modern scientific whimsey about anthropomorphism, that to think of God in the ideal human form is not only not superstititous and degrading to God, but is possible and rational. The ideal human form, or even the actual normal human, form is worthy of all reverence. Great beauty of person always commands universal attention, even though it may not correspond to high moral character. Such artistic natures as those of Thackeray and Heine fell into ecstacy over the Venus de Milo; and in general it is impossible to conceive any more beautiful outward form than that of the human body. If the objection be raised that the doctrine of immanence precludes the thought of God under any form, we reply by pointing to the common fact of experience, in which we see, in human beings, spaceless mind, immanent throughout the extended body. That we objectify the visible w orld in space, does not

mean that God really stretches throughout a real objective space. It does not follow that we must or ought to think of God in this idealistically anthropomorphic way, but if we attempt to think, under the category of form, we must be anthropomorphic, and being anthropomorphic, we must follow the suggestions of our own nature, and are neither irrational, nor do we necessarily fall into superstition. Only we must remember that the essence of personality does not involve form at all.

But now to the doctrine of the personality of God, a subtler objection rises. Thinking and willing, as we know them in ourselves, are constituted by the relation of the subject and object, the ego and non-ego. The knowing subject distinguishes itself from the known object to which it stands opposed and by which it is limited. It discovers and does not create its material; it depends for the content of its knowledge upon the presented world. So, too, the willing subject is directed by its wants to the objects external to itself, by which it is satisfied, or restrained and resisted. This gives the appearance of limited being, - the ego conditioned by the non-ego. How then can we assign such determinations of our own finite thinking and willing to God, without making him finite? Is the only alternative to deny to him conscious spiritual life, and call him the Un-conscious Reason or unknowable force? This would lead to fatal results, as shown above, both to cognition and ethics.

But to consider the objection: The self-conscious, self-determining life of man is the highest form of life we know. Even if this be

limited to the finite, and cannot in this form be attributed to God, does it therefore follow that we must deny to God the highest elements our experience reveals to us? Evidently not. The stream cannot rise higher than its source, the effect cannot be greater than the cause, nor the part contain more than the whole. It were imposible to think of the Infinite Cause, that he produces along with all things else freer intelligence and self-determination in man, and should fall far below man in the possession of spiritual energy. On the contrary, he must in this regard rise above man as the Infinite rises above the finite.

But now if we come nearer to the question and ask, just what is the essence of self consciousness? we shall find it to lie in this. A self-activity which distinguishes itself as a permanent and constructive identity, over against the manifold and changing content of consciousness. Finite self consciousness is often thought to be only a distinguishing of the ego from the non-ego; but in reality, at bottom, it is a distinguishing of self from self, the permanent self-identical unity of the ego from its own manifold presentations, thoughts, and feelings. So then, the Infinite has the objects of his knowledge in his own activities. While we, as conditioned and finite, must look for the ground of our subjective objects outside of ourselves. God as the Absolute and Infinite has ground of his objects in himself.

So also with self-determination. The essence of will is not primarily desire, directed to external things, but it is self-determination

of the unitary inner being, which posits ends to itself, as it acts upon the multiplicity and variety of its own inner states. We, as conditioned and finite, posit ends beyond ourselves, and are assisted or hindered by external means. But the Absolute and Infinite posits, by his free activity, not only the ends but the means thereto as well.

In considering the ethical character of God, another serious difficulty is often presented. It is this. Ethical qualities, such as love, justice, &c., necessarily imply a community of beings, hence, God cannot love or be just in his single and only self existence. So the ethical attributes have sometimes been considered as not an essential to the absolute existence. They arise as activities, relative to creation which serves as an object for their exercise. To seek to avoid this conclusion by offering the doctrine of the Trinity, only adds a metaphysical mystery that is insoluble.

We may gain some light, by a practical consideration ~~in view~~ of the real nature of our own spiritual being. Not to love ones self, to be wholly unselfish, is commonly considered the highest reach of moral attainment. But this bare statement does not include the whole problem. Does this mean that we are to leave ourselves entirely out of all consideration, to such an extent, that we may cease to be or become wholly lost in others? This would be self-destruction, and hence we should have no more reason to seek for the realization of any ends whatever. Whom are we to love, and to what end? The only answer is, Others like ourselves and for their good.

But is not the obligation upon them also to love us and for our good? Manifestly so, with the result that our good and their good is thus greatly increased. The highest ethical command we have received is to love our neighbor as ourselves. The efficiency and worth of our love for others, then, depends upon the character of our love for ourselves; and the higher the ideal character of that love rises, the more we bless our neighbors and our neighbors, since the principle is universal, bless us. In view of this, we see some meaning in the saying of Bishop Wilson; We love our neighbors as much on our own account as on theirs. Here we get a higher and truer sense of forgetting ourselves and loving others. It is a transformed self-love, it is a self-love that preserves us and exalts us by an enlarging of the scope of our being. False self-love, or selfishness, is a mistake as to what our true selves include. Our true selves include the entire community of our neighbors, which means the world of man; so that, in loving our neighbors, we are loving ourselves. We die in all acts of self-sacrifice for others, but we are not annihilated; we rise to a higher and a greater life. We lose the world in self-sacrifice, but we win our own souls. All this will be objected to as a refined sort of utilitarianism, but this objection does not hold, unless utilitarianism is taken to include our highest ethical satisfactions. For, in the light of this higher self love, we see how no man can consider himself saved until all are saved. The love of the mother for her child is such that

she could not be satisfied to remain in heaven, while her child was in hell; that is, her love for the child would not permit her to feel saved, feel the perfect satisfaction of wellbeing, so long as her child suffered or went astray.

Now the enriching and deepening sympathies of the moral man, in living relation with his neighbors, come more and more to identify their interests with his own, as they do his with theirs; and thus render it impossible for him to be content, while any man suffers or is lost. The figure of Paul for the church as the body of Christ, ought to be expanded, in view of the universal duty of love, to take in mankind, so that, in a real sense, when one member suffers all the members suffer with him. This truly Christian doctrine of the solidarity of the race, by which we understand that the interests of each is bound up with that of all, and of all with that of each, is, in modern times, being more clearly pressed upon us in the seemingly non-ethical movements of civilization,- in financial, commercial, and political activities, in the discoveries and inventions of science, and in the development of international law. He who loves his neighbor, and all his neighbors, most, loves himself best. He who does not love himself, has no standard by which to estimate his duty of love to his neighbor. What that self-love should be, however, is not determined by particular individual interests, but must expand to include the welfare of all. To love ourselves truly means to hold sacred the interests of all other men; to hold thus sacred the interests of all other men means true self-love. Man

does not come into the full possession of himself until the kingdom of the brotherhood of man be fully come and the Holy Will of God , who is Love, is done on earth even as it is in heaven.

Now while for finite beings this development of love is only possible through the mediation of finite objects upon which to exercise that love, which is meant to include all in the kingdom of universal brotherhood; for the Infinite, the mediation of no such external objects is necessary, and, as the sum of all being, he forever loves himself.

Since then we have reason to attribute to God, in unlimited perfection, those essential elements of personality we find in ourselves, we may conclude with Lotze, that God alone is the true Person and we are but faint copies of him. In any case, if we retain for ourselves the determinationsof consciousness and personality, we cannot call the Infinite unconscious and impersonal, but rather superconscious and superpersonal,

But when we have thus reached the Infinite personality who, as Self-conscious Wisdom and Love, *is* the only possible ground on which our finite knowing and willing can rest, we should sacredly guard ourselves from that irreverent and sacreligious haste that rushes to disclose the mysteries of the Eternal Being and of his counsels, which for us are past finding out.

IV.

Our next question is: What relation does God, the Absolute First Cause, Infinite in Wisdom and Goodness, sustain to the world and to

man? The world and man, as finite and conditioned must ever depend for their existence, continuance, direction, and meaning upon the Absolute and Infinite. How this is, the mind can in no way determine; that it is, the mind must affirm, and it is competent moreover to make out, in the light of its own nature, some of the relations that exist between them. Our determinations on this subject must be consistent with the conclusions already reached. The natural order we found to be a mechanism of interacting elements, proceeding according to uniform laws and thus forming an harmonious system. As a sum of things, or a system of interdependent parts, it has no independent existence. Being conditioned and finite, it has no substantial reality, but rests upon the unitary World-Ground as its Absolute and Infinite Cause, in which, as cause, exists Reality. We also found that mind withdrew itself from the mechanism of unconscious necessary interaction, as possessing a real existence by virtue of its self-conscious, self-identical, self-determining activity. . Yet, as conditioned and finite, like the mechanism, it finds itself, though possessing marks of reality, dependent upon the Absolute and Infinite Cause, in which alone exists perfect reality. Moreover, we found that the mechanism in order to come into relations with thought, and thus become intelligible, must be itself some sort of thought activity. To take it in the crude sense of naïve realism, would put it forever beyond the reach of thought.

Concerning God as the Absolute and Infinite Cause, we found ourselves

driven to the conclusion, in order to preserve our intellectual and moral nature from meaningless and unjustifiable annihilation, that in the Divine Being there is Absolute and Infinite Wisdom and Goodness. From these determinations, the result for thought is : The World and man, as finite, depend for their existence and meaning on the plan of the Infinite who, in the forms of Wisdom moves purposeively through the finite toward the realization of his ends, the supreme motive of which is Love.

It yet remains to reach clearer determinations, as to the relations of the Infinite to the finite. Two main conceptions may be formed, namely, those of Pantheism and of Theism. All forms of materialism must be summarily set aside as immature inconsequences.

1. We consider, first, Pantheism in its various forms and implications so far as it bears upon conceptions of the relation of the Infinite to the finite.

i. Before it deserves respectful or serious attention, it must be purged of its cruder forms, such as conceive the finite to be , in some way, an emanation from the Infinite. All views based on this notion, consider the finite as a part or mode of the infinite, who is the world substance out of which all things are made. This vacates the necessity for a First Cause, and represents God as so much stuff, more or less fine, which is partly exhausted in providing for the material of the world. But the primal reality on which all things depend, and in which they have their source, is not a stuff but an agent. We have before seen that whatever reality

there is for us in the mechanism of nature, it must be an activity of such kind as to arouse our intelligence to reaction. That which gives anything real existence, by which it asserts itself, is not inert passive substantiality, but activity. For an explantion, then, of the world, we do not need substance but an agent, not matter but an efficient Cause. In so far as the world is a causal activity, it is real, but so far as its activity is conditioned and caused by the Absolute and Infinite First Cause, its reality disappears into the absolute and infinite Reality. Furthermore, God, as the efficient agent of all activities, is unitary Being, uncompounded and indivisible. Hence, the world is not a part of God in any sense, for this implies his divisibility and stuff-like nature. "His necessary unity forbids all attempts to identify him with the world, either totally or partially. If the finite be anything real, it must be viewed, not as produced from God, but as produced by God; that is, created. Only creation can reconcile the reality of the finite with the unity of the Infinite. For the finite, if real, is an agent, and as such it cannot be made out of anything, but is posited by the Infinite." (Bowne's Philosophy of Theism, p. 174.)

We saw a moment ago that the world, as a mechanism of interrelated elements, lost its reality in the causal efficiency of the Absolute on which it depends. Hence, we may say of it, that, while it is not God and is ever to be distinguished from his unchanging and unconditoned Self Existence, it is yet a form of activity in God, and de-

rives its entire claim to permanence, order, law, and meaning from the reality of the divine nature.

But we found not only the finite world, but the finite mind, with this fundamental distinction between them: The one is impersonal and driven from behind by necessary laws; the other is personal, that is, self-conscious and self-determined, and freely posits various ends which, while retaining its self-identical unity, it realizes by moving, as causal agent in the choice of manifold means, to those ends. Though finite and caused, and so dependent for its existence on the Infinite Cause, it yet rises to a share in real being, by reason of its power as a self-conscious and self-determined causal agent. It is this personal selfhood that gives it real otherness to the Infinite Reality. The impersonal mechanism of the world has only such otherness to the Infinite as thought activity has to its subject.

ii. Having purged pantheism of its crude stuff theories, in which the world is considered as a mode of the Infinite substance, by pointing out that substantial reality is unitary and indivisible causal agency, and hence that the finite rests upon divine activity; we come to those higher, because more rational, forms of pantheism. Here the finite is regarded as the necessary consequence of the divine nature; and the doctrine may take two forms, depending upon the metaphysical view of being.

(1) In one case, we have Spinozism which is a fuller expression

of the ancient Eleatic philosophy. God is looked upon "As the all-conditioning substance, and the world, as its necessary implication coexists eternally with it". This affirms the eternity of all things or banishes change as a reality of experience, gives no account of interaction among things, and thus, reducing our knowledge to mere illusion, brings us to the Hindu and Eleatic changeless One, which, as pointed out before, is not real being but an abstraction of the nature of simple logical unity.

(2) In the second case, pantheism represents the Infinite "As forever energizing according to certain laws, and producing thereby a great variety of products". These laws are the necessary methods of activity, inherent in the Divine Nature, by which it must act, as they admit of no change. This identifies the world-order and the Divine Nature. "The world-ground is simply the unitary principle and basal reality of the cosmos, and is exhausted in its cosmic manifestations. There is immanence without transcendence; and God and the world are but the opposite names for the same thing." The advantage of this view over the preceding one is that it attempts to give some account of change which proceeds according to law. Professor Borden P. Bowne, in his Philosophy of Theism, cap. 5. from which the above and following quotations are taken, and to which the reader is referred for a clear and complete discussion of this theme, has shown the unsatisfactoriness of pantheism in all ~~its effects~~ respects.

a. Ethically it leads to a complete determinism, both in God

and in man. If all things happen by necessity, there can be no prevision and purpose. All things being determined from eternity, there is no room for freedom, and hence the moral distinctions of good and evil disappear.

b. Speculatively, pantheism is (1) unclear in that it provides only for the world order and not for its details. The specific facts of the universe cannot be deduced in any way from its general laws, which constitute the world order; and consequently, all cosmic details must be carried into the Divine nature. As grounded on the divine, their shifting, temporal, determined, character reduces the Infinite to a temporal mode of existence and hence, his Absoluteness disappears. The self-determining alone can be absolute.

(2) It denies self determination, and hence, some ground must be discovered for the changing activity of the Infinite. This must be some mechanism in the Infinite, whereby its states interact and determine the outcome. To carry out this view, would destroy the unity of the Infinite in any true sense of the term. The only unity of which we have any knowledge, is that of the free and conscious self, the peculiar nature of which is to distinguish itself from all its states and acts and yet be present in them all. This is the only true unity that we can conceive.

(3) Its claim that natural laws and products are a necessary outcome, is purely hypothetical. The present order can, by no method of reflection, be deduced as a necessary implication of

necessary truths. It is contingent and might have been wholly different under the present system of necessary truth.

(4) It overturns reason itself as all systems of necessity do. Truth and error, as necessary results of precedent causes, lose their rational meaning, as well as do good and evil.

2. We have left then only one conclusion, that of Theism. If the world, depending on the divine activity, cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of the divine nature, we must consider it as an outcome of the Divine Will, which, by a free act of creation, posits and orders all finite things. This view has the advantage of saving us from the speculative sins of carrying time and evolution into God, with all the petty details and hostile antitheses of the actual present world; and of trying to deduce creation as a necessitated result. It also prevents us from identifying the world and God. God is in the world and the world is in God and of God, but it is not God; It is a free creative activity of God.

In thus basing the world on the Divine Will, we must not attach to the Divine Willing human limitations. As indicated before, our willing finds its objects external to itself, and it depends upon means which hinder or help it to reach those objects. Our willing is momentary, mediate, and limited; but, as the Divine Being includes in himself all being, no external object conditions or controls his activity,- the Divine Will proceeds immediately and eternally to its ends. With the question as to the eternal or temporal will to create, we are not concerned here. For our purpose, it is sufficient that the

world is a product of the Divine Will.

We then ask: What is its present relation to that will? Three views may be considered.

(1) Deism represents the world as created, and then flung off to continue its existence, by means of its own stored up powers. God is thus freed from its government without any further connection with it, except the original historical one of creation. This view presents the alternative that either the world is wholly independent of God, or else in part depends upon him. But in the first case, the unity of the Absolute and Infinite is destroyed. We should have two independent beings in the universe, with no means of mediating between them. This is a crude and impossible view.

In the second case, if the world depends in part upon God, it must depend entirely upon him. If not, it would be, in part, independent, and thus we should have an impossible conception again.

An error which may partly account for this deistical view, is that of subordinating God to the eternal truths, by making them independent of him and regulative of his activity. Time and space are also added as existing apart from God; and, at times, even matter is given as an "orginal datum objective to God". God is represented as finding these data, with which he works up a world. Then, of course, it can go on quite independent of him, since it is constituted of principlesand stuff that are in no way dependent upon him.

This, however, is an antique form of thought. No principles and no material data can exist as objective to God without destroying his

Absolute Unity. Nor can we think of eternal truth as existing prior to God, and conditioning his activity. This would destroy his metaphysical Absoluteness and Infinity. God expresses his existence by the name , I Am, and the eternal truths are not before him but with him, through eternity as the self-determined expression of his changeless character. They are before us, and necessarily condition all of our thought and activity; but to think that they are such for God, by the implications of the question, Can God think or act contrary to them? is to repeat the simple folly of saying that God, who is the ground and cause of all thought and activity, would be different if he were different.

The world has no rights or laws in itself whereby it can secure for itself an independent real existence, but, at every moment and in every part, rests upon the Infinite, and is ''Simply the form in which the Divine Purpose realizes itself''.

(2) We might now react to the opposite extreme view, which looks upon the continued existence of the world as a perpetual creation. The uniform order and harmony of mechanism are due not to a divine conservation, but to the constant divine activity of creation.

This view would be possible if the physical system were the only element concerned. The natural order has its meaning in the determined perpetual ongoing of a process, according to law; and this uniform process might be thought of as the constant creativeactivity of the Infinite. But when we come to a world of living, free intelligences, this view loses itself in unsolvable difficulties.

Self-conscious spirits must think of themselves as constantly preserved by the Divine activity; a perpetual creation is utterly unthinkable. We recognize, in our self-conscious, self-determined ego, some right to be considered realities, but how this fact can co-exist with the no less certain fact that we forever depend on the Absolute and Infinite, is a mystery which transcends thought. The existence of the mystery however does not deny the fact.

This presence of finite free spirits in the cosmos gives the deepest meaning to the question of the relation of God to the world. So far as the physical system is concerned, we have only to look upon God as its creator and preserver; no further predicates are necessary. Government, when applied to things, has no meaning, it has meaning only when applied to finite spirits whose freedom makes it possible for them "To withdraw themselves from the general plan which the ruler aims to realize".

But the freedom of finite spirits which the divine government implies is not an end, but only a means. Freedom has no significance unless some good can be attained by its exercise. "Hence, the notion of a world government acquires rational meaning only as a supreme good exists which is to be the outcome of creation, and which, therefore, gives the law for all personal activity.".

We ask then: What is this grand world end toward which creative activity moves, and in which is found the law for all free beings? Nature can give us no answer. The particular ends which she

reveals have no supreme worth, and the cosmos, as a whole, gives us no clear idea of an end at all. We must look for our answer in the moral realm.

The ethical ideal points the individual to the complete development of his nature, in mutual relations with the community which includes all other men who, with him, are to realize the end of a harmonious world-brotherhood. But free finite spirits, individually and collectively, are not the source and cause of this historical development. As conditioned and caused, they rest upon the Absolute Firt Cause, who not only creates and preserves them, but also establishes the law of their being as free moral spirits, in purposively directing the world order, both natural and historical, toward that grand end which is consistent with his Eternal Love.

This cosmic law, being but the self-determined method by which the Infinite orders the mechanism of nature and the historical life of man, does not abolish freedom, but establishes it. In fact, freedom for the moral man, who has a moral goal to reach, and for whom the moral Infinité has set up that goal, necessitates a law, into harmony with which, he by his own self-determinations is to bring himself, in order to the full development of his true being. Man, by the imperative demands of the "Ought to be" is ever directing himself away from the present real to the future ideal. The essence of his life is a becoming, as he moves towards an end to which he freely and consciously gives his assent and bends his efforts. The more so, as he recognizes, in the law above him, an expression of the Holy Will

of Infinite Love which sets forth, as the goal of his constant striving, the realization of his total nature, the attainment of which gives him true freedom, in that he here finds himself in harmony with his highest self, with all other finite beings, and with God. Inclination no longer strives with duty, passion with rational volition, what is with what ought to be; but the real and the ideal have become one. If the infinite Love is recognized as the source from which man starts, the law by which he acts, and the end toward which he moves, he may, as an individual and as a representative of mankind, use the inspired words of the Psalmist, as the expression of his deepest yearning; "I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness;" and the no less inspired words of Augustine, as his deepest conviction: "Thou hast created us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it has come to rest in Thee."

Before proceeding to our conclusion, concerning the natural and the supernatural, we may do well to gather up, in a brief summary, the results of our preceding thought.

We found that antiquity, on awakening to reflection, took two directions toward a monotheistic conception. On the one hand, the Hindu and Eleatic philosophies ran off into the abstract conception of pure changeless Being, which reduced the actual world of experience to illusion. Plato, in his lofty idealism, while he saved Greek thought, in his central ideas, to sound theistic views, was too much influenced by the Hellenic Intellectualism and, moreover, was vitiated by a dualistic notion of God and the world. On the other hand, the

Hebrew Prophets, because of their deep ethical sense, rose to a true, though particularistic, ethical theism, which the Rabbis subsequently obscured by an elaborate traditional cult.

But Jesus, going back to the prophetic idea, refined and exalted it into the true universal doctrine of the Heavenly Father, who works purposively among men, through the unfolding kingdom of human fellowship; and thus saves the individual and the race by revealing the true character of man who, as the son of God, must bring himself to the full realization of his ideal nature. We observed also in Jesus a new and higher view of nature, which is represented as an illustrative expression of divine truth. It is never despised nor condemned as evil, but held forth as revealing the unchanging and universal providential care of God.

Although this ethical theism of Jesus is satisfactory to the moral and religious consciousness, it must yet give some account of itself to reason, from the side of a speculative view of God, man, and the world. If this great intuition is to be harmonized with the demands of cognition, we may expect to find the synthesis in modern thought.

We then proceeded to gain some notion of what the scientific and philosophical culture of our time has to say concerning God, man, the world, and their relations.

Our conclusions in short were these:-

The world of nature is a harmonious system of things, bound into a unity by the necessary control of uniform, universal laws. Since it

has no ground in itself, it depends upon the absolute First Cause; and since it is intelligible by mind, its nature must be of a kind with mental activity. It is not what it appears to be, but is an interpretation of intelligence, reacting upon outer impulses and objectifying them under the form of the visible world. Its reality , therefore, is phenominal, and consists of activity in the originally creative divine causal Intelligence, adapted to constructive response in the interpretative human intelligence.

Man, the only finite having some degree of otherness to the Infinite, on whom as First Cause he depends, has realness by reason of his free intelligence, manifested in his self-conscious, self-identical, self-determined unity, which he maintains amid the changing manifoldness of things. He constructs an intelligible ideal which he seeks to confirm, as the truth; and an ethical ideal which he strives to realize, as the good.

God, as the Ground of the World and of man, is the Absolute and Infinite unitary First Cause. To give meaning to man's intellectual and moral natures, which construct the ideal intelligible and ideal ethical worlds, wisdom and goodness must be asserted of God: who, as a free self-conscious self-determined Intelligence, becomes Personal in the truest and highest sense.

Concerning his relations to the finite, God is the Creator and Preserver, and not the fundamental substance or stuff out of which things are made or from which they emanate. Pantheism loses itself in illusionism or determinism, which destroys the intellectual and

ethical life of man; and hence, the theistic view of creation and preservation is the only position possible to thought.

God, then, by an act of the will, creates the world and man and pre-preserves them in time. The deistical view of God's present relation to the world is untenable, in that it destroys the absoluteness of the Absolute, and gives no rational account of the world; and, hence, we must think of the Infinite as ever immanent in the finite, while yet ever transcendent to it.

The question of the government of the Infinite over the finite has meaning only in view of free intelligences, capable of obedience or disobedience; and freedom has meaning only when it is regarded as a means to some worthy end. This end is the ethical ideal, discovered in the individual conscience, and revealed in the unfolding developments of history; and, since it is above man's origination or control, is the law of his being, established by the Absolute and Infinite, who purposively moves through the whole cosmic order of nature and of man to the fulfilment of his supreme designs which are determined by his wisdom and love. This cosmic law which, as the holy will of the Eternal, establishes the course of the natural and historical world-orders, does not abolish freedom but rater secures it, inasmuch as freedom does not mean release from law, but implies law as the norm of its activity, and only finds itself fully realized when that law is fully obeyed: that is, when man, the free intelligent and free ethical being, comes to the perfect realization of his true nature in the kingdom of a Holy Brotherhood, through which the

divine purposes of love are ever revealed.

But here we come upon the ethical theism of Jesus; and we have reached it by a course of speculative thought. We were not, however, forced to this conclusion by logical proofs, but constrained thereto, not only because all other conclusions land us in chaos or annihilation, but because, without contradicting fact or reason, it gives the largest meaning to the total life of man, intellectual, aesthetic and moral. As we anticipated at the beginning, the essence of the teachings of Jesus, when speculatively considered, provesto be the only sound basis on which a rational science and a rational ethics can exist.

C.

In the light of the preceeding views concerning God, man, the world, and their relations, we are now prepared to draw some rational conclusions concerning the natural and the supernatural.

We can no longer think of nature as full of supersensuous, irresponsible, capricious spirits, good or bad, who exercise a salutary or baneful influence over her.

So far as our experiences go, such might still be the case but the belief of our ancestors in this kind of supernaturalism, has given way before our intellectual ideal of a uniform, harmonious, natural order, proceeding in accordance with invariable laws. The free spirits, once thought to be active in the whispering forests, the murmuring fountains, the roaring seas, the quaking earth or the changing sky, have been during the history of our growing science, reduced to the uniform control of mechanical causation. And so deep has this conviction become with us, that exceptional and inexplicable events which are not yet amenable to any known classification or law, are nevertheless believed to be, as other events have been, capable of reduction to the control of the general mechanism of nature. This ideal belief in the uniformity of nature embraces what we call the natural. The incalculable gain to us, both practically and theoretically, need not be dwelt upon here. Our investigations, however, have been directed not only

toward the natural world-order, but also toward the historical world-order, in which especially the supernatural once had an important place. Of such preeminent worth have intellectual, aesthetic and ethical considerations always been to man, that he has ever been fain to assign to the great discoveries and developments of his inner life in history, some non-natural explanation, outside the ordinary course of things. Modern historical criticism, however, has, by applying to the past its recently won knowledge of physical nature and human nature, robbed myths and legends of their supernatural wonders, by which the ancients thought to explain such important events as, some useful, practical discovery, the invention of letters, the rise of knowledge, the fortunes of battle, the founding of tribes, ethnic migrations, and, in short, all those great changes arising out of the spiritual life of man in society. The natural fact that fire is of such incalculable value in the useful arts, is no longer to be accounted for as a titanic theft from the gods. As great as Athens was in antiquity, and as influential as she has been in all times, her wisdom and power cannot be explained by the miraculous planting of the olive tree upon the Acropolis.

All such accounts, of which ancient secular history is full, have been shown to be the result of the poetic imagination, not guided by correct cosmic views, playing a bout natural events of the utmost importance.

And from the days of Semler, there has been given no good reason why sacred history should not also come under the survey of a scientific criticism. In consequence of which, the great worth of the Mosaic code can no longer be based on the audible voice of Yaweh, heard amid the awful quakings and thunder of Sinai; or the successful conquest of a Joshua on a pausing sun or the descent of preternatural hail stones.

What did happen in the past was doubtless something of great worth to man. Our criticism does not dispute the fact, but changes the explanation; and criticism gains its force not from a general scepticism that nothing occurred in other ages that does not occur in ours, but from this, that the ancient views of events were the most natural and, in fact, only outcome possible in the light of their general cosmic conceptions. With a belief that the sky was a solid sphere, not far removed from the earth, it was easy for the ancient Hebrew or ancient Roman to think of his great prophet or great founder as snatched away thither in a chariot of fire. By the historical survey, we see how the greatness of a man is in no way enhanced by miraculous accompaniments. Isaiah was a greater prophet than Elijah, and Alexander a greater founder than Romulus, and yet both of them died a natural death and the great influence of their work and lives may be fully read in terms of events going on around us naturally every day.

So to the mechanism of the natural procedure, we add the mechanism of the historical procedure; they together form one uniform orderly cosmic ongoing.

But are we to conclude that there is nothing above this natural order? Looking again at the mechanism of nature, and recalling our conclusions, we see that man rises above it by reason of his free, intelligent, purposive activity, and in that sense is supernatural. Nature, as a necessary mechanism, gives no account of the productions of man's free agency, nor could she, unassisted, in any way, bring them about. The founding of societies, the establishment of laws, the inventions of science, the creations of art and music, poetry, architecture, sculpture, painting, the thinking out of philosophies, and the activities of the moral and religious life, are above the determined natural order, and belong wholly to the realm of self-identical, self-determining mind, which thereby proves itself a truly supernatural power. This does not mean that man is wholly above nature. He perpetually depends upon it, and is perpetually conditioned by it, -- helped or resisted by its permanent forces and invariable laws, but he modifies and controls it for the production of results it could not alone reach. We may say then of man's relation to nature, that he is conditionally supernatural.

Again, we have seen that the natural mechanism cannot be grounded on itself, either by virtue of the sum of its parts, or its harmonious action as a whole; it rests upon the unitary First

Cause, who freely creates and preserves it as ever subordinate to the changeless purposes of Intelligent Will. It is not God, or a part of God, as pantheism teaches; but a uniform activity in God, who is forever distinguished from it, and who, through it, forever seems to express to man the integrity of his Eternal Righteousness. In God, then, as the free ground of the natural order, we have the Absolute Supernatural, through nature in all its activities, but above it and eternally regnant over it, immanent but also transcendent. Above nature, then, is man conditionally supernatural and God absolutely supernatural.

A moment ago, from the teachings of historical criticism, we reached the conclusion that the life of man, in the historical order, belongs to the natural order; and then straightway found that man, in all his social developments, must be withdrawn from the natural order, as above it, conditionally supernatural. But the contradiction will be seen to be only verbal, and not real, when we recall the course of our previous investigation.

We saw that the historical world-order brought us to the realm of ethics. Here a new element is introduced into the problem, viz: a free-intelligent activity, moving towards self-determined ends. Moreover, in this world of social development, there reveals itself to man the ethical ideal, as objective to him, and yet, as expressing his true nature, toward the realization of which he must bend every effort of his free activity. He sees that "what is", is not "what ought

to be", and so he presses on to the goal of right, the attainment of which brings him to the utmost freedom, in the full possession of himself.

Hence, the historical world-order, while, as involving the free individual and collective agency of man, is supernatural to the natural world-order, is yet natural, in this sense, that it proceeds by a uniform process of orderly development, toward the not yet realized goal of man's true nature, expressed in the ethical ideal. There are no unaccountable breaks or lapses in it, but, by a continuous unfolding, it moves along to its destined outcome. The moral world-order, as a free progressing and expanding of the moral nature of the individual and the race, is above the natural world-order; yet it has its own laws of procedure, which are determined by the character of the moral nature.

This course of historical development toward the ethical ideal, alone gives worth to the life of man, and so deeply has this been felt, as seen in the moral and religious convictions of mankind, that it has been a quite general impression that, to account for its origin, to help it along, to prevent man's losing sight of it, and to insure its outcome, there has been needed, from time to time, miraculous and non-natural interferences from the outside in the ordinary course of events.

Especially has this impression had currency among Christian Apologetes. So great and and so precious for man are the truths of

Christianity, that it has been thought necessary to find an explanation for them outside the natural historical-order, and some support for them in miraculous evidences. The New Testament literature and times have furnished the fundamental grounds for such claims. But there has been presented no valid reason why the New Testament literature and times should not be brought under the same criticism to which all other literatures and times have been subjected; and the present universal scientific consciousness can not bring itself seriously to admit, either the fact of, or reason for, any startling exceptions, in the course of nature or of history, during any favored period of time. Moreover, an impartial historical criticism has revealed the natural causes of the belief in so-called miraculous events. In an age of naïve beliefs, or at best, of crude dualistic cosmic theories, an age without any proper science whatever and without any comprehensive view of God, the world and man, and their mutual relations, it was, for example, natural that epilepsy, insanity, and disease, in general, should be attributed to demoniacial possession. It could be believed, without any violence to rational convictions, that angels appeared in bodily form, audible voices were heard from heaven, graves opened and dead men, brought to life, walked again the streets. We can easily understand how if some great electrician of our own day, who deals with natural forces, were suddenly carried back to the miraculous age, he would

be looked upon as a devil or a god.

If we add the observation that, when knowledge increases and a better understanding is formed of both the natural and historical orders, such events do not occur, the conviction is inevitable, that they never did occur; but are to be attributed to subjective interpretations put upon natural events, similar to those becoming within our present experience. This conclusion is not compelled by syllogism, nor does it always come by conscious rational process, but it presses itself upon the general consciousness by an entire change in the point of view from which things are seen. The inevitableness of the conclusion is revealed in the changed front of Christian Apologetics itself. Especially, since the days of Neander's reply to Strauss, miracles have been withdrawn from the category of infraction of natural laws,- the bold claim of earlier apologetes,- and have been accounted for, as a simple hastening of the natural process, or as due to some higher law yet unknown, or likened to natural processes with which we are all familiar.

The weakness of Christian Apologetics, on this point, has been twofold: It has proceeded on the erroneous convictions (1) that miracles have a necessary evidential worth, to establish and confirm the inherent truth of Christianity; and (2) that the giving up of miracles is the giving up of all Christian truth, together with a belief in the supernatural world. The statement is commonly heard from the pulpit, and often seen in Christian writings, that if Jesus did not rise physically from the grave, then his whole life-work and

supreme significance for man are thereby nullified. That such positions are most inconsequential and misleading may be seen by a closer reading of the Gospels themselves and a better understanding of their never over-estimated spiritual worth.

The contention here is not that miracles are impossible. We know that the logic of possibilities is something beyond calculation. But, it is held first, that, in the light of the genius and spirit of Jesus himself, aside from scientific and historical considerations, miracles are not characteristic of him or his teachings, and are not evidential of their worth; but that their inherent truth carries its own most convincing and saving evidence. Jesus rebuked those who asked for a sign, by pointing them to the signs of the times,- the meaning of natural current historical events. From the records of his life, it is evident that, by reason of his exalted and pure character, he entered into some powerful sympathetic union with nature by which he wrought mighty works, especially in the case of disease. In some way, he calmed the furious demoniac of Gadara, but we cannot think it was by driving out ten thousand devils, who gained from him the permission, on their expulsion from a man, of entering into swine. This is not like him, this does not belong to the spiritual character of his whole bearing. Miracles are theatrical and showy, they appeal to a morbid curiosity, they are lusted after by an adulterous generation, they do not at all have a part in the ethical and spiritual development of the individual or of the race. A deeper reading into the Gospels will make it more and more

evident that Jesus naturalized truth. It was his contemporaries and disciples who tried to supernaturalize it, to enhance its value by thaumaturgic wonders. He made the power of his kingdom of righteousness to be like the winds that come and go, or like the leaven that spreads in the meal, or like the seed cast into the ground which grows into the great tree. These illustrations were all taken from the natural processes of nature. There were those about Jesus, and they still exist, who would take the kingdom of heaven by force, but he would not have it so. They wanted him to erect a powerful world-empire, but he pointed them to a slow development through struggle, persecution, and death. They wanted him to return in the clouds of heaven, with great glory, but he never came thus.

Again, the incredibility of miracles is held from the nature of the case itself. When we ask for the reason of his irresponsive silence to the popular demands and expectations, we can somewhat comprehend his deep wisdom. Christianity is not to take the world by compelling, external evidences; it is a silent inner spiritual force that, transforming the heart, is to make its way by slow natural development throughout human society. "My kingdom is not of this world" said Jesus, and he knew that by a mere outward display of power, the spiritual nature of man would not be changed. Were a written message to be flashed across the sky, in characters no man could mistake, that Christiantity is the only true religion, it might affect somewhat the outward life of man, but it would still take ages for him to become spiritually minded.

It is often held forth, as a confirmation of the evidential worth of the miraculous, that, in three short centuries, the Roman Empire became Christian, the Roman Emperor himself bowing to the cross. But, from all that history brings us, we cannot feel sure that Constantine was the best of Christians. So far as the Roman world at large is concerned, its Christianity was very superficial, mixed with elements of Greek thought and heathen practices. And we are bold in this statement, in view of the fact, that the so-called Christian world, even in our day, though profoundly affected by many Christian conceptions, is still far from the goal of Jesus, in his kingdom of brotherly fellowship. And even the Christian church has room for improvement, when rigorously compared with the Christianity of its Great Founder. All this points to the fact that the spread of Christianity is a spiritual growth, along lines of natural development. Jesus always recognized this fact and foretold it. He is characterized everywhere by inwardness, by spirituality, so foreign to the thaumaturgic popular mind; and his truth then was and now is to be received by the seeing eye and the hearing ear, as naturally as the outer world is revealed to us through the natural senses. To the awakened spiritual nature, the truth of Jesus comes with power and beauty. It needs no other evidence than its own inherent worth. All imaginable evidences would avail nothing to the spiritually blind and deaf, and when the eye and ear are opened, other evidences than the truth itself affords are inconsequences. He that hath eyes to see, will see; and he that hath ears to hear, will hear.

If it be said that miracles might have been needed, as a provisional economic means, to strengthes the convictions of the first feeble Christian community, it might be replied that miracles were rather the creation of that first community, as some sort of explanation for the deep and powerful realities experienced within the heart and life. When we consider the work of Paul, the mightiest factor in early Christianity, we see that he depended on argument, persuasion, and the entreaty of love, on the power of a new life and an awakened hope for the future. With Paul, Christianity was an ethical and spiritual power within the life of every man who received it. Much harm is always done the truth by diverting attention from the essential and real to the non-essential and accidental, as is done by laying stress upon miracles, or, in any way, defending them. They simply have nothing to do with the triumph of Christianity in the world. The pre-eminent mark of the religion of Jesus is that it is natural, in that it is just fitted to the nature of man, not as he actually is but as he ought to be, as a son of the Heavenly Father. This ideal which Jesus himself realized and towards which he looked for every man, expresses what the nature of man really is, in its ideal worth; and in the purposive working of the Divine Will throughout human history, the ideal is to be realized among men in the kingdom of heaven which Jesus preached. From these considerations, we are convinced that miracles are not evidential of the truth, but that the truth, from the nature of the case, must bear within itself its own evidence to the awakened mind and heart.

Secondly, it follows, that the giving up of miracles is not the giving up of any truth whatever. Miracles are certainly not with us now, but the truth is; and it is as great as it ever has been. All the saving doctrines of Christianity as Christ preached them, God the Father of all men, the incalculable worth of the soul, man the brother of man, the Kingdom of God's will to be established in human society, repentance from sin, death the way to life, love the supreme law, cannot be lessened in their eternal worth by the absence of attendant miracles.

Moreover, the historical Jesus remains, whatever may be done with the popular view of the supernatural. When we consider the moral beauty, power, and exaltedness of his pure character, he is, indeed the ethical miracle of history; and when we note the profound harmony that existed between him and the world of nature, we may still have some reason for the belief that he exercised a control over it that is supernatural to us, at our present stage of moral development; but a control, to the attainment of which, our experiences of slowly increasing natural power, coincident with our gradual moralization, vaguely point. "He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall ye do also, and greater works than these shall he do", may emphasize the suggestion heretofore made that, when men attain to the moral perfection of Jesus, they too may be safely trusted, without danger of abuse, with power, like his, over nature.

Again, it must be urged against a common misunderstanding of the popular mind, that because the miraculous is reduced to the natural

historical order of development, the supernatural is not thereby annulled, nor is the possibility of the fact of revelation therefrom and communion therewith denied.

Have we not learned that above the mechanism of nature, as its cause and ground, immanent in it but ever transcendent to it, is the Absolute Supernatural? And as man communes from day to day, in all the intelligent activities of his life, with nature, which is but the objective thought of God, does he not evermore have revelations from the Indinite.

But, further, as the visible world perpetually rests upon the Divine Will, so also does man, as caused and dependent, rest upon the Absolute First Cause. And, while the ethical ideal is expressive of man's true nature, it is, yet, discovered and not created by him, and, hence, the law established by Eternal Love, according to which God moves purposively through human history, not compelling but leading man, by means of his own free rational choices toward the Kingdom of the Children of God. Is not here the true Absolute Supernatural, above nature, above man, but ever in nature and in man expressing His Holy Will? And along the course of his whole ethical development, may not, have not, consoling and saving revelations of the Father's Love come to the world of men?

Just as the objective impulses of nature arouse the mind to read the natural meaning; or, better, as the few marks of the Divine proceeding in the world enable a Newton to read the mighty law of God's dealings with the stars, may we not with open eye and attentive

ear also receive a revelation of God's righteousness and love, in the moral world-order that sweeps on before us and through us?

The poets and the prophets have thus with the inner eye read the divine messages. Just as Newton, by observation of the natural world-order, read God's way therein, in the law of gravitation; so Moses, by observation of the ethical world-order, read God's way therein when the Lord passed by defore him and proclaimed, ''The Eternal, the Eternal God, merciful and gracious, long suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty''! (Ex. xxxiv.6,7)

The difference between these two revelations is found in the preeminent worth of the ethical over the natural truth.

And now no longer does revelation confine itself to some miraculous burning bush, or quaking mount, and , although we come far short of the profound spiritual insight of the great, yet Jesus has divinized the world, even for the humblest of us, by proclaiming that''neither in this mountain nor at Jeruselam'' need we worship God, for with the ever present living Spirit the sincere and reverent heart may at all times and everywhere commune.

Hence, we conclude that to the necessary mechanism of nature, man, in his self-conscious, self-determined life, as he freely moves toward his ideal goal of the Kingdom of Righteousness, is supernatural; but as he comes to this goal by a slow natural ethical development,

he may be said to belong to the total natural cosmic order. Supernatural from one point of view, natural from another. Yet his naturalness, in the light of the ethical ideal, consists in an unfolding development through which, by communion and fellowship with God, the Absolute Supernatural, he comes to himself and returns to his Father's House.

The difficulties of this view, to which we are brought, cannot be overlooked. How the sin and evil in the world are consistent with Infinite Love, is a question for which speculative thought can find no answer. And ethically, we can only hold to the conviction that there is a solution which we have not yet reached,

In all questions of theodicy, however, pantheistic views must be entirely discarded. Nature with all its shifting changes must not be carried into the Divine Essence. It is not God but an objective activity of God. Why he should act as he does in nature is not transparent to our thought; but the Divine activity in the world must not be confused with the Divine nature.

As to sin, it must be confessed that the Divine Energy works together with the sinner. Whatever the assasin or the sot may do, depends on the efficieney of the forces that the Infinite places in his hands. But it must be remembered that the law of freedom lays upon man the responsibility of his choices. To be free he must be permitted to fall as well as to rise.

Then, too, it is the ethical ideal that reveals sin, "by the law sin came ", and not until it has appeared in some degree to man,

do his actions rise to the category of sin, but belong to the region of instinctive brutal impulses. To those over whom the ethical ideal has sway, much of the evil of the world disappears.
How the free purposes of the Infinite and the free purposes of the finite coexist, we admit, is an insoluble mystery. We accept the mystery as a fact which transcends our thought, but does not abolish our freedom. A denial of freedom, in God or in man, annuls reason, and makes thought impossible.

We have now to draw the main conclusions as to the relations between God, Man, and the World.

God, ever active in the world of nature, which is a stage for man's training and discipline , and from which he can read the faithful thoughts of His creator, God, ever active in the world of history, which is the temporal course for man's development towards his true goal, and in which he can read the purposes of the Eternal. God, ever active in the heart of man, who bears the divine image, and who recognizes therein his true character and destiny as a son of the Highest. In all this there are two realities, God and Man. The only reality of Nature is that of a purposive activity in the divine will. It has its origin in mind, and is intelligible by mind. It is mind alone that has the eternal worth of reality.

" All that is at all,
Lasts ever past recall;
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure;
What entered into thee,
That was, is, and shall be;
Time's wheel runs back or stops; Potter and clay endure.
Rabbi ben Ezra "

As man, in perception, interprets nature by the constructive power of his intelligence, the Infinite therein reveals himself to the finite day by day. As man, in science, learns the great ways of nature by means of his rational understanding, God therein makes known to him his faithful changeless goings. So that science has been falsely dealt with by those who have, with its help, sought to put God out of the world. The true science of mind and of nature brings God into the world, and may adopt as an expression of its conclusions the words of the last Laureate

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains,—
Are not these, Oh Soul, the vision of Him who reigns?
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Dark is the world to thee: thyself art the reason why;
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel 'I am I'.
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Speak to Him then for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet.

But God comes closer to man and speaks with a clearer voice than he does through nature, in scientific truth, as he reveals himself in the ethical world-order. Not only does he give forth his law to the individual moral consciousness, but to the moral consciousness of the race. Just as the intelligence enlarges and refines, it sees more of the divine wisdom in nature; so also, as the conscience enlarges and refines, it comes to know more of the divine goodness in

history. But the truth in nature and the goodness in history are one, having their source in the eternal wisdom and goodness of God; and, as the spirit grows attentive to the divine meanings, it will become aware not only of the truth in history, but also of the goodness in nature. Science will begin to see the law of progress, and orderly advance in all historical religious developments; and religion will see the divine goodness in all the forms and modes of the natural world. Who that studies the mind and spirit of Christ can but find in him this union of the growing kingdom of God among men, with the forces and powers of nature, as expressions of the heavenly Father's goodness. To him it was present, he is indeed the son of God; to us it is yet afar off, but towards it our world of men is journeying, and, as we learn more of truth and come to know more of goodness, as the mind enlarges and the heart expands, as to our awakening souls the commonest things of life will reveal the Divine presence, so that, even when we sit at meat, there shall be a sacramental feast whereat God presides, we shall see the natural refine to the supernatural, the human rise to the divine, and men enter their Father's House, as the sons of God. Well may we say with Paul:

"Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! . . . . . For of him and through him and to him are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen."

(Romans XI. 33-36)

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